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ABSTRACT 
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE FINAL FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE APOLLO 10 MISSION. IT INCLUDES 
DATA FROM THE NASA CENTER 5-DAY, 30-DAY AND 60~DAY REPORTS, AND THE APOLLO 11 FLIGHT READINESS 
REVIEW. THE REPORT INCLUDES A SUMMARY OF THE MISSION, A SUMMARY OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 
AND THE ANOMALIES ENCOUNTERED DURING THE MISSION. THE ANOMALIES ARE LIS'rED IN A SEPARATE SEC-
TION ACCORDING TO LAUNCH VEHICLE SPACECRAFT, AND GROUND SYSTEMS. 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE BOEING COMPANY WOC/TIE UNDER NASA/APO MAT-l TECHNICAL 
DIRECTION; CONTRACT NASW-1650, TASK NO. 10.0. 
KEY WORDS 
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APOLLO 10 
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1. 0 INTRODUCTION 
APOLLO 10 WAS THE THIRD MANNED SATURN V FLIGHT, THE SECOND FLIGHT OF A MANNED LUNAR MODULE, 
AND THE FIRST MISSION TO OPERATE THE COMPLETE APOLLO SPACECRAFT AROUND THE MOON. THIS 
MISSION PROVIDED ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE FOR THE CREW, SPACE VEHICLE, AND MISSION-
ORIENTED FACILITIES DURING A SIMULATED LUNAR LANDING MISSION. 
APOLLO 10 (SA-505/CS-I06/LM-4) WAS AN "F" TYPE MISSION DESIGNED TO DUPLICATE CONDITIONS OF 
THE LUNAR LANDING MISSION (APOLLO 11) AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT ACTUALLY Lru~DING. 
1.1 CARRY-OVER ANOMALIES FOR SUBSEQUENT FLIGH'l' READINESS REVIEWS 
FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN 2 P'JRGE DUCT (PG 17) 
TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CHARGE (PG 68) 
HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE 
DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA (PG 91) 
LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING (PG 97) 
- ---,- ----.. ------ ......... -... -.~---.. ~ .... -~~. 
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1.2 MISSION SUMMARY 
FIRST PERIOD 
THE APOLLO 10 WAS SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED FROM LAUNCH COMPLEX 39A AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, 
FLORIDA ON MAY 18, 1969 AT 12:49 P.M. EDT, WITH NO UNSCHEDULED HOLDS. THE CREW WAS COM-
POSED OF LT. COL. THOMAS STAFFORD, CDMR. JOHN YOUNG AND CDMR. EUGENE CERNAN. THE LAUNCH VEHICLE 
PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY, ACHIEVING AN EARTH PARKING ORBIT OF 102.6 x 99.6 NhUTICAL . 
MILES (NM) AT 00:11:52.8 (HRS:MIN:SEC) GET (GROUND ELAPSED TIME). TRANSLUNAR INJECTION (PRE-
TLI) CHECKOUT WAS CONDUCTED AS PLANNED. THE TLI BURN LASTED 5 MINUTES 43 SECONDS WITH ALL 
SYSTEMS OPERATING SATISPACTORILY AND ALL END CONDITIONS BEING NOMINAL FOR THE TRANSLUNAR 
COAST, FREE REWRN CIP.(;UMLUNAR TRAJECTORY. 
AFTER CSM SEPARATION FROM THE LMjSLAjIUjS-IVB AT 3:02:51 (HRS:MIN:SEC) GET, CSM TRANSPOSITION 
AND DOCKING WEP~ COMPLETED BY 3:17 GET. EXCELLENT QUALITY COLOR TELEVISION COVERAGE OF 
THE DOCKING SEQUENCES WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE GOLDSTONE TRACKING STATION AND WAS SEEN ON WORLD-
WIDE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION. EJECTION OF THE CSMjLM FROM THE S-IVB WAS SUCCESSFULLY 
ACCOMPLISHED AT 3:56:24 GET, AND A 2.5-SECOND SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM (SPS) EVASIVE MANEUVER 
WAS PERFORMED AS PLANNED AT 4:39:09.8 GET. 
ALL LAUNCH VEHICLE SAFING ACTIVITIES AND THE S-IVB LIQUID OXYGEN AND LIQUID HYDROGEN LEAD 
TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT EXPERIMENTS WERE PERFORMED SUCCESSFULLY AS SCHEDULED. THE SUBSEQUENT 
PROPEL~~T DUMP WAS SUCCESSFUL AND SUFFICIENT IMPULSE WAS PROVIDED TO THE S-IVB FOR A 
"SLINGSHOT" MANEUVER TO EARTH ESCAPE VELOCITY. AUGMENTATION OF THIS IMPULSE BY THE S-IVB 
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM ULLAGE ENGINE BURN WAS TERMINATED BY GROUND CO~MAND I~~DIATELY 
AFTER IGNITION. THE CLOSEST APPROACH OF THE S-IVB TO THE MOON WAS 1752 NM AT 78:54 GET. 
SECOND PERIOD 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTION BURN NUMBER 1 (MCC-l), ORIGINALLY PLANNED AT 11:30 GET AS A 47 FOOT-PER-
SECOND (FPS) SPS MANEUVER, WAS NOT CONDUCTED. MIDCOURSE CORRECTION MANEUVER NUMBER 2 (MCC-2) 
WAS PER?ORMED AT 26:32:56.8 GET BY A 6.7-SECQND FIRING OF THE SPS RESULTING IN ~ VELOC1TY 
CHANGE OF 48.9 FPS (48.7 FPS PLANNED). ALL PARA1-lETERS APPEARED NOMINAL AND THE RESUL'fING 
PERICYNTHION WAS 60.9 NM. CONSEQUENTLY, MIDCOURSE CORRECTION MANEUVERS NUMBERS 3 AND 4 WERE 
NOT REQUIRED. BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN PLANNED MIDCOURSE EVENTS, ALL LUNAR EVENTS WERE 
ACCOMPLISHED APPROXIMATELY TWELVE MINUTES AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. FIVE COLOR TV TRANSMISSIONS 
TOTALING 72 MINU'l'ES WERE MADE DURING TRANSLUNAR COAST. 
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THE LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION MANEUVER (LOI-l) WAS PLANNED IN REAL TIME FOR 75:55:54 GET AND 
WAR ACCOMPLISHED ON SCHEDULE. THE SPS ENGINE BURNED FOR 356 SECONDS RESULTING IN AN 
INITIAL OP,'3IT OF 170.6 BY 60.2 NM. THIS COMPARES VERY WELL WITH THE PRELAUNCH-PLANNED 
ORBIT OF 170 BY 60 NM, AND THE REAL-TIME-PLANNED ORBIT OF 170.7 BY 59.7 NM. THE SPS BUIDI 
DATA APPEARED TO BE NOMINAL, WITH FUEL TANK PRESSURE AND OXIDIZER INTERFACE PRESSURE 
SLIGHTLY ON THE HIGH SIDE OF NOMINAL, BUT WELL WITHIN EXPECTED TOLERANCE. 
THE LUNAR ORBIT CIRCULARIZATION MANEUVLR, LOI-2, WAS PLANNED IN REAL TIME FOR 80:25:07 
GE'i' AND WAS ALSO ACCOMPLISHED ON SCHEDULE. THE SPS ENGINE BURNED FOR 14 SECONDS RESULT-
ING IN AN INITIAL OI~IT OF 61.9 BY 59.2 NM. THIS COMPARES WELL WITH ?HE PRELAUNCH-
PlANNED ORBIT OF 60 BY 60 NM AND THE REAL-TIME-PLANNED ORBIT OF 60.1 BY bO.l NM. ALL SPS 
Pl~TERS WERE NOMINAL. 
It 29-MINUTE SCHEDULED COLOR 'rELEVISION TRANSMISSION OF THE LUNAR SURFACE WAS CONDUCTED 
AT 80:45 GET (21:34 EDT, 21 MAY). LUNAR LANDMARK TRACKING ON TWO TARGETS WAS ACCOMPLISHED 
AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THESE LANDMARKS WERE WELL SPACED AND OF GOOD QUALITY. 
THE LUNAR MODULE PILOT TRANSFERRED Tv THE LM AT 81:55 GET FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS OF SCHEDULED 
"HOUSEKEEPING" ACTIVITIES AND SOME LM COMMUNICATIONS TESTS. THE TESTS \iERE TERMINATED 
AFTER THE LM RELAY COMMUNICATIONS TESTS BECAUSE OF TIME LIMITATIONS. RESULTS OF THE 
COMPLETED TESTS WERE EXCELLENT AND THOSE TESTS REMAINING WERE CONDUCTED AT A LATER TIME TN 
THE MISSION. 
THIRD PERIOD 
THE COMMANDER AND LUNAR MODULE PILOT ENTERED THE LM AT 95: 02 GET AND PERFORMED THE PRE-
PLANNED CHECKS OF ALL SYSTEMS. THE RENDEZVOUS EXERCISE WAS BEGUN ON TIME WITH UNDOCKING 
AT 98:22 GET. THE SERVICE MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (SM RCS) WAS USED TO SEPARATE 
THE CSM ABOUT 30 FEET FROM THE LM. SUBSEQUENTLY THE LM LANDING GEAR WAS DEPLOYED. 
STATIONKEEPING WAS INITIATED AT THIS POINT WHILE THE COMMAND MODULE PILOT ItJ THE CSM 
VISUALLY INSPECTED THE LM. THE SM RCS WAS THEN USED TO PERFORM THE SEPARATION MANEUVER 
DIRECTED RADIALLY DOWNWARD TOWARD THE MOON'S CENTER. THIS MANEUVER PROVIDED AN LM/CSM 
SEPARA'l.'ION AT DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION (DOl) OF ABOiJT 2 NAUTICAL MILES. THE DOl WAS 
PERFORMED BY AN LM DES,:;ENT PROPULSION SYSTEM (DPS) BURN lHORIZONTAL, RETROGRADE), SUCH 
THAT THE RESULTING PER:,-CYNTHION (LOWEST POINT IN ORBIT) OCCURRED ABOUT 15° PRIOR TO 
LUNAR LANDING SITE NUMBER 2. THE LOWEST ALTI'l'UDE ABOVE THE MOON I ~ SURFJl.CE ACHIEVED BY 
THE LM WAS 8.4 NM. NUMEROUS PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE LUNAR SURFACE WERE TAKEN; HOWEVER, SOME 
CAMERA MALFUNCTIONS WERE REPORTED. ALTHOUGH SOME COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICU£TIES WERE 
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EXPERIENCED, THE CREW PROVIDED 1'~ CONTINUOUS COMMENTARY ON THEIR OBSERVATIONS. '):HE LM 
Lru~DING RADAR TEST WAS EXECUTED DURING THE LOW ALTITUDE PASS OVER THE SURFACE. EARLY 
DATA INDICATES INITIAL Jl.CQUISI'IION OCCURREC AT A HEIGHT OF 65,000 FEET. INDICATED 
PERICYNTHION ALTITCDE AS MEASUI~D BY THE LANDING RADAR DURING THE FLY-BY WAS 47,000 
FEE'J' • 
THE SECOND LM MANE,OVER. THE DPS PHASING BURN, ESTABLISHED AT THE RESULTING LM PERICYNTHION, 
A CSM LEAD ANGLE EQUIVALENT TO THAT WHICH WOULD OCCUR DURING THE LUNAR LANDING MISSION. 
THf~ A?OCYNTHION ALTITtiDE OF THE PHASING ORBIT WAS 190.1 NM • 
.ABOUT 'l'EN MINU'l'ES PRIOR TO PERICYNTHION, THE LM DESCENT STAGE WAS JETTISONED. THE LM 
REACTION CONTR0L SYSTEM (LM ReS) SEPARATION ¥ANEu\~R AT STAGING WAS ACCOM~LISHED USING 
'rHE ABORT GUID1~CE SYSTEM (AGS) AS PRESCRIBED IN PREMISSION PLANS. INADVERTENTLY, THE 
MODE CONTROL S'f;ITCH WAS LEFT IN "AUTO" RATHER THAN THE REQUIRED "ATTITUDE HOLD" MODE. 
IN AUTO, THE hGS A'l'TEMP'l'ED TO POINT THE LM Z AXIS TOWARD THE CM. THE COMMANDER TOOK 
OVER MANUAL CONTRO'L TO REESTl~BLISH THE PROPER LM ATTITUDE. THEN, AT PERICYNTHION, THE 
INSERTION lA.ANI-;UVER WAS PERFORMED ON TIME USING THE LM ASCENT PROPULSION SYSTEM (APS). 
THIS BURN EST1\.BJ .. ISH!::D THE EQUIVALENT OF THE STANDARD LM INSERTION ORBIT (45 BY 11. 2 N~n 
OF A LUNAR LA..~DIUG MISSION. 
THE LM COASTED FROM INSERTION IN THE 45.3 NM BY 11. 2 NM ORBIT FOR ABOUT J.~N HOUR. CON-
CENTRIC SEQUENCE INITIATION (CSI) WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT APOCYNTHION. A SMAI,L CONSTANT 
DELTA HEIGHT (CDH) MANEUVER WAS REQUIRED (AS EXPECTED) TO NULL OUT MINOR CISPERSIONS. 
THE TERMINAL ~~EUVER OCCU~D AT ABOU~' THE MIDPOINT OF DARKNESS. BRAKING DURING THE 
TERMINAL PHASE FINALIZATION (TPF) WAS PERFORMED MANUALLY AS PLANNED. 
THE f~NDEZVOuS WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND ALL PARAMETERS WERE VERY CLOSE TO NOMINAL. CSM-
ACTIVE DOCKING WAS ACCOMPLISHED SMOO'fHI.Y .M.ND EXPEDITIOUSLY AT 106: 22: 00 GET. 
ONCE DOCKED TO THE CSM, THE TWO LM CRE~ffiN TRANSFERRED WITH THE EXPOSED FILM PACKETS AND 
THE I,M HASSEU3LAD CAMERA TO THE CS!'4. THE LM MAURER SEQUENCE CAMERA. AND PRIMARY LITHIUM 
HYDROXIDE C]\!~NISTER (BOTH OF WHICH J NCURRED INFLIGHT PROBLEMS) WERE :'.~,.':;'J TRANSFERRED TO 
THE CSM SO THESE ITEMS COULD BE INS~)ECTED POSTFI.IGHT. THE CSM VJAS SEPARATED FROM THE 
LM AT 108:43:30 GET USING THE SM ReS. 
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FOURTH PERIOD 
ABOUT ONE REVOLUTION AFTER DOCKING, THE LM APS BURN TO DEPLETION WAS COMMANDED BY THE 
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT NETWORK (MSFN), UTILIZING THE LM ASCENT ENGINE ARMING ASSEMBLY. 
THIS BURN PLACED THE LM IN A SOLAR ORBIT. LM/MSFN COMMUNICATIONS WERE MAINTAINED UNTIL 
LM ASCENT STAGE BATTERY DEPLETION AT ABOUT 12 HOURS AFTER CSM/LM SEPARATION. 
DURING THE REMAINING LUNAR ORBITAL PERIOD OF OPERATION, 18 LANDMARK SIGHTINGS AND 
EXTENSIVE STEREO STRIP AND OBLIQUE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN. TWO SCHEGULED TV PE~IODS 
WERE DELETED BECAUSE OF CREW FATIGUE. THE CREW SIGHTED THE LM DESCENT STAGE ON SEVERAL 
OCCASIONS. AT 137:36:28 GET, THE SPS INJECTED THE CSM INTO A TRANSEARTH TRAJECTORY 
AFTER A TOTAL TIME IN LUNAR ORBIT OF 61.5 HOURS (31 ORBITS). THE TEl BURN WAS TARGETED 
FOR A TRANSEARTH RETUI~ TIME OF 53 HOURS. 
FIFTH PERIOD 
THIS PERIOD COMMENCED WITH A LIVE TELEVISION THANSMISSION THROUGH THE HONEYSUCKLE TRACK-
ING Sl'ATION AND INTELSAT III COMr.-~UNICA~lONS SATELLITE, SHORTLY AFTER TEl AT 137:51 GE'r. 
FOCUS AT ALL ZOOM LENS SETTINGS WAS EXCELLENT. ANOTHER COLOR TELEVISION TRANSMISSION 
NAS RECEIVED AT 139:27 GET. 
FOLLOWING A SLEEP PERIOD, STAR ~UNAR LANDMARK NAVIGATION ?IGHTI~GS WERE TAKEN AT 151:00 
GET. 
THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSEARTH I.~JECTION (TEl) MANEUVER WAS sun~ THAT THE FIRST TRANS-
T'ARTH MIDCOURSE CORRECTlm; U·k"'~- ~) ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOn 1.52: 00 GET WAS NOT NECESSARY. 
THE WASTE WATER DUMP CONDUC'l'e[, i .... ~· j 53: 50 GET WAS ORIENTED TO ~DUCE 'hiE PROBABILI'I'Y OF 
MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS. CHECKcr.::',,7 THe ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT 
154: 35 GET TO ENSUP.E ITS READ H-i';", : :'r' -, THE EN'rRY PHl\SE. 
A TEN-MINUTE COLOR TELEVISION BROAOCA;' 1. ',J:,~; : ::\ ,';'=: t.T APPROXIMATELY 14"7: ~D GET. A TWENTY-
NINE-MINUTE BROAOCAST OF THE MOON, EAi<TH, "'.l~£' SPACECRAFT INTERIOR WAS RECEIVED AT 152: J 
GET. A NUMBER OF STAR-EARTH HORIZON NAVIGATION SIGHTINGS WERE TAKEN. THE CSM S-BAND 
HIGH-GAIN REFLECTIVITY TEST WAS CONDUCTED AT 168:00 GET. AN UNSCHEDULED LIVE COLOR 
TELEVISION TRANSMISSION OF THE EARTH AND THE COMMAND MODULE INTERIOR WAS RECEIVED AT 
137:27 GET. THE SECOND TRANSEARTH MIDCOURSE CORRECTI~N (MCC-6) ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 
176:50 GET WAS NOT NECESSARY. 
SIXTH PERIOD 
THE CREW WAS AWAKENED AT 185: 00 GET AND INITIATED ENTRY PREPARA':!'IONS. THE FINAL LIVE 
COLOR TEI,EVISION TRANSMISSIOt.1 WAS RECEIvr.D A~' 186:50 GET. MCC-7 WAS PERFORMED AT 
188:49:57 GET. ENTRY INTERF.~~E WAS REACHED AT 191:48:54 GE'X WITH SPLASHDOWN IN THE 
MID-PACIFIC. AT APPROXIMATELY 15°S AND 165°W. FLIGHT CREW PERFORMANCE WAS OUT8TANDING. 
ALL THREE CREW MEMBERS REMAINED IN EXCELLENT HEALTH THROUGHOUT THE MISSION. 
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1.3 APOLLO PROGRAM IMPACT. 
SINCE THE FIRRT SATURN FLIGHT, THE APOLLO PROGRAM HAS BEEN BUILDING FOR A LUNAR LANDING AND 
~XPLORATION OF THE LUNAR SURFACE. EACH SUCCESSIVE FLIGHT HAS EVALUATED THE PERFORMANCE AND 
OPEJ<AT:IONAL CM>ACITY OF SPECIFIC PIECES OF HARDWARE AND OPERl'.'rING PROCEDURES. THE FIRST 
APO:i:..LO FLIGHTS, AS-201 THROUGH APOLLO 6, WERE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT. 
l!'I.IGHTS. APOLLO 7, THE FIRST MA.~NED APOLLO FLIGHT, DEMONSTRATED CSM/CREW PERFORMANCE AND CSM 
RENDEZVOUS CAPABILITY. THE APOLLO 8 MISSION PROVIDED THE NEXT PHASE IN THE APOLLO PROGRAM 
BY SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATING CSM OPERATIONS AND SELECTED BACKUP LUNAR LANDING MISSION ACTIV-
IT ... ES IN LUNAR ORBIT.. APOLLO 9 WAS AN EARTH-ORBITAL MISSION WHICH DEMONS'l'RA'l'ED CSM/LM OPERA-
TIONS &~D LM/CREW PERFORMANCE CF SELECTED LUNAR LANDING MISSION ACTIVITIES IN EARTH ORBIT. 
THE PURPOSE OF THE APOLLO 10 MISSION, A LUNAR-ORBI'l'AL MISSION, WAS TO EVALUATE LM PERFORM-
ANCE IN THE CISLUNAR AND LUNAR ENVIRONMENT AND TO DUPLICATE THE LUNAR LANDING PROFILE AS 
CLOSELY AS rOSSIBLE WITHOUT ACTUALLY LANDING. 
SUFFICIENT DATA WERE OBTAINED TO VERIFY THAT ALL PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WERE MET. NO MA,JOR ANO~.­
LIES WERE ENCOUNTERED WHICH WOULD IMPOSE A CONSTRAINT ON FUTURE MISSIUclS. 
THE SUCCESS OF THE APOLLO 10 MISSION VERIFIED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SPACE VFHICLE AND SUPPORT 
SYSTEMS ENABLING THE PROGRAM TO PROCEED WITH THE ACTUAL LUNAR LANDING MISSION, APOLLO 11. 
7 
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1.4 SUMMARY OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT 
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES 
o DEMONSTRATE CREW/SPACE VEHICI.E/MISSION SUPPORT FACILITIES PERFORMANCE DURING A MANNED 
LUNAR MISSION WITH CSM AND LM. 
o EVALUATE LM PERFORMANCE IN THE CISLUNAR AND LUNAR ENVIRONMENT. 
ALL OF THE APOLLO 10 MISSION PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WERE OBTAINED. ONE ~)F 'l'T-{E SECONDARY DETAIL 
TEST OBJECTIVES (6.-9) WAS CANCELLED AND ANOTHER (20.80) EXPERIENCED SOME COMMUNICATION PROBLr~, 
BUT DID NOT IMPACT THE MISSION. 
TABLE I IS A LIST OF EVENT TIMES COMPARING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRE-MISSION PLANNED EVENT 
TIMES AND ACTUAL MISSION TIMES. A DELAY OF THE FIRST MIDCOURSE CORRECTION TO THE MCC-2 OPTION 
CAUSED THE TRANSLUNAR TRAJECTORY TO BE LONGER THAN PLANNED THUS DELAYING LUNAR ORBIT EVENTS 
APPROXIMATELY 12 MINUTES. A LISTING OF LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES, 
ALONG WITH THE RESPECTIVE DEGREE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT FOLLOWS: 
LAUNCH VEHICLE 
OBJECTIVE 
1. (~: VERIFY J-2 ENGINE MODIFICATIONS. 
2. (S) CONFIRM J-2 ENGINE ENVIRONMENT IN S-II AND 
S-IVB STAGES. 
ACCOMPLISHMENT 
NO PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED 
NO PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED 
J. (S) CONFIRM LAUt.:CH VEHICLE I~ONGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT DURING S-IC STAGE BURN PERIOD. 
THIS OBJEC'I'IVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY 
DEMONSTRATED. 
4. (S) VERIFY THAT MODIFlCATICN INCORPORATED IN THE S-IC 
STAGE SUPPRESS LOW FREQUENCY LONGITUDINAL OSCILLA-
TIONS. 
5. (S) CONFIRM LAUNCH VEHICLE LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATI0N 
ENVIRONMENT DURING S-II STAGE BURN PERIOD. 
__ -----_____ ___.'_ "" ___ ~ ...... _f _ _.."'~ ___ ·_,.,.. .. · .. · .. · ...... ·,_ 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY 
DEMONSTRATED. 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SUCCESSFULLY 
DEMONSTRATED. 
8 
, " 
, "'-~-~' -, 
OBJECTIVE 
6. (S) ~EMONST&\TE THAT EARLY CENTER ENGINE CUTOFF 
FOR S-II STAGE SUPPRESSES LOW FREQUENCY 
LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS. 
SPACECRAFT 
P(20.78) 
P(16.10) 
P(20.121) 
P(20.91) 
P(16.14) 
P(20.66) 
P (11.15) 
OBJECTIVE 
DEMONSTRATE CSM/LM RENDEZVOUS CAPABILITY 
FOR A LUNAR LANDING MISSION. 
PERFORM MANUAL AND AUT0MATIC ACQUISITION, 
TRACKING, AND COMMUNICA"rIDNS WITH MSFN 
USING THE STEERABLE S-BAND ANTENNA AT 
LUNAR DISTANCE. 
PERFORM LUNAR LANDMARK TRACKING FROM THE 
CSM WHILE IN LUNAR ORBIT. 
PERFORM LUNAR LANDMARK TRACKING IN LUNAR 
ORBI~ FROM THE CSM WITH THE LM ATTACHED. 
OPERATE THE LANDING RADAR AT THE CLOSEST 
APPROACH TO THE MOON AND DURING DPS BURNS. 
OBTAIN DATA ON THE CM AND LM cru~w PROCE-
DURES AND TlMELINE FOR THE LUNAR ORBIT 
PHASE OF A LUNAR LANDING MISSION. 
PERFORM PGNCS/DPS UNDOCKED DESCENT ORBIT 
INSERTION (DOl) AND A HIGH THRUST MANEUVER. 
'C I 
: '. 
ACCOMPLISHMF;NT 
SATISFACTORILY DEMONSTRATED. EARLY 
SHUTDOWN SUCCESSFULLY ELIMINATED 
THE PROBLEM. 
ACCOMPLISHMENT 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY 
DEMONSTRATED. 
COMPLETED SATI8FACTORILY, SOME 
DIFFICULTIES DURING REV. 13. 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY 
PERFORMED. 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY 
PERFORMED. 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS COMPLETED 
SATISFACTORILY. 
THIS DATA WAS OBTAINED. 
THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED. 
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3(16.17 
S(16.12) 
S(16.15) 
S(13.14) 
S(12.9) 
S(20.77) 
S(20.86) 
S7.26) 
S(20.79) 
S (12. A) 
OBJEC'I'IVES ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
DEMONSTRATE LM/CSM/MSFN COMMUNICA~IONS DATA OBTAINED SOME PROBLEMS DUE TO 
AT LUNAR DISTANCE. PROCEEDUAL ERRORS. 
COMMUNICATE WITH MSFN USING THE LM·- DATA OBTAINED, SOME PROBLEMS DURING 
S-BAND 0MNIANTENNAS AT LUNAR DISTANCE P~V. 13. 
OB~AIN DATA ON THE RENDEZVOUS RADAN PER- DATA OBTAINED. 
FORMANCE AND CAPABILITY NEAR MAXIMUM 
RANGE. 
OBTAIN SUPERCRITICAL HELIUM SYSTEft.! PRESSURE DATA OBTAINED ,. 
DA~A ~HILE IN STANDBY CONDITIONS AND 
DURING ALL DPS ENGINE FIRINGS. 
PERFORM AN UNMANNED AGS-CONTROLLED APS THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED SATIS-
BURN. FACTORILY. 
OBTAIN DATA ON THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATA OBTAINED. 
OF VHF RANGING DURING A LM-ACTIVE RENDEZVOUS. 
OBTAIN DATA ON THE EFFECTS OF LUNAR ILLUMINA- DATA OETAINED. 
TION AND CONTRAST CONDITIONS ON CREW VISUAL 
PERCEPTION WHILE IN LUNAR ORBIT. 
OBTAIN DATA ON THE PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL DATA. OBTAINED. 
(PTC) SYSTEM DURING A LUNAR ORBIT MISSION. 
DEMONSTRATE CSM/LM PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL DATA OBTAINED SATISFACTORILY. 
MODES DURING A LUNAR ORBIT MISSION. 
DEMONSTRATE RCS TRANSLATION AND ATTITUDE THIS OBJECTIVE WAS SATISFACTORILY 
CONTROL OF THE STAGED LM USING AUTOMATIC DEMONSTRATED. 
AND MANUAL AGS/CES CONTROL. 
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S(12.10) 
S(20.82) 
S(20.80) 
S(13.13) 
S(20.117) 
S(11.17) 
S(6.9) 
S(20.46~ 
S(20.95) 
S(12.6) 
S(1.39) 
S(20.83) 
OBJECTIVES 
EVALUATE THE ABILITY OF THE AGS TO 
PERFORM A LM-ACTlVE RENDEZVOUS. 
MONI~OR PGNCS/AGS PERFORMANCE DURING 
LUNAR ORBIT OPERATIONS. 
DEMONSTRATE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A 
CSM/LM LUNAR ORBIT MISSION. 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
COMPLET' ~D. 
DA'fA OBTAINED. 
SOME COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS. 
PERFORM A LONG DURATION UNMANNED APS BURN. THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED SATIS-
FACTORILY. 
PERFORM LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION USING SPS 
GNCS-CONTROLLED BURNS WITH A DOCKED CSM/ THIS OBJECTIVE WAS PERFORMED SATIS-
LM FACTORILY. 
OBTAIN DATA TO VERIFY IMU PERFORMANCE DATA OBTAINED. 
IN THE FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT. 
PERFORM A REFLECTIVITY TEST USING THE CANCELLED WHILE DOCKED. 
CSM S-BAND HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA WHILE DOCKED. 
PERFORM CSM TRANSPOSITION, DOCKING, AND COMPLETED. 
CSM/LM EJECTION AFTER THE S-IVB TLI BURN. 
PERFORM TRANSLUNAR MIDCOURSE CORREC~IONS. COMPLETED-ONLY ONE OF FOUR MIDCOURSE 
CORRECTIONS REQUIRED. 
OBTAIN AGS PERFORMANCE DATA IN THE FLIGHT 
ENVIRONMENT. DATA OBTAINED. 
PERFORM STAR-LUNAR LANDMARK SIGIITINGS DURING DAl'A OBTAINED. 
THE TRANSEARTH PHASE. 
OBTAIN DATA ON LM CONSUMABLES FOR A SIMULATED DATA OBTAINED. 
LUNAR LANDING MIBSION, IN LUNAR ORBIT, TO 
DETERMINE LUNAR LANDING MISSION CONSUMABLES. 
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TABLE I APOLLO 10 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
~VENT ACTUAL TIME PLANNED TIME DIFF 
(HR:MIN:SEC) (HR:MIN:SEC) (MIN: SEC) 
Liftoff 0:00:00 0:00:00 0:00 
Pitch and Roll Start 0:00:13 0:00:12 + 0 :01 
Roll Complete 0:0~:32 0:00:30 + 0 :02 
S-IC IBECO 0:02:15 0:02:15 0:00 
Begin Tilt Arrest 0:02:37 0:02:37 0:00 
S-IC OBECO 0:02:42 0:02:40 + 0 :02 
S-IC/S-II Separation 0:02:42 0:02:41 + 0: 01 
S-II Engine Start 0:02:43 0:02:42 + 0: 01 
S-II Second Plane Separation 0:03:12 0:03:11 + 0: 01 
LE'l' Jettison 0:03:18 0:03:16 + 0: 02 
S-II Cutoff 0:09:13 0:09:14 -0:01 
S-II/S-IW Separation 0:09:13 0:09:15 -0:01 
S-lW Engine Start 0:09:14 0:09:15 -0:01 
S-IW Cutof r 0:11:44 0:11:44 0:00 
Insertion 0:11:54 0:11:54 0:00 
TLI (S-IW) 2: 39 : 21 2:39:17 +0:04 
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TABLE I APOLLO 10 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
EVENT 
Evasive Maneuver (SPS) 
MCC-l (SPS) 
MCC-2 (SPS) 
MCC-.3 (SM RCS) 
MCC-4 
LOI-l (SPS) 
LOI-2 (SPS) 
Undock (SM RCS) 
CSM/LM Separation Maneuver 
(SM RCS) 
DOl (LM DPS) 
Phasing (LM DPS) 
Staging (LM RCS) 
Insertion (LM APS) 
CSI (LM RCS) 
COH (LM RCS) 
ACTUAL TIME 
(HR:MIN :SEC) 
4:39:10 
Not Required 
26:32:57 
Not Required 
Not Required 
75:55:54 
80: 25: 0 7 
98:22:00 
98:47:16 
99:46:01 
100:58:25 
102:45:00 
102:55:01 
103:45:55 
104:43:52 
* Omission of MCC-l delayed lunar orbit event times. 
PLANNED TIME 
(HR: MIN: SEC) 
4:28:48 
9:38:46 
26:39:17 
53:45:43 
70:45:43 
75:45:43 
80: 10: 46 
98:05:16 
98:35:15 
99:33:57 
100:46:21 
102:33:18 
102:43:1a 
103:33:46 
104:31:42 
DIFF 
(MIN:SEC) 
+0:22 
-7:40 
+lC:ll* 
+14:21 
+16:44 
+12:00 
+12:04 
+12:04 
+11:42 
+11:43 
+12:09 
+12:09 
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TABLE I APOLLO 10 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
E\ENT 
TPI (LM RCS) 
Docking (SM RCS) 
APS Depletion (LM. APS) 
TEl (SPS) 
MCC-5 
loCC-6 
MCC-7 
Entry Interface (400,000 feet) 
Splashdown 
ACTUAL TIME 
(HR:MIN: SEC) 
105:22:55 
106:22:08 
108:51:01 
137:36:28 
Not Required 
Not Required 
188:49:57 
191:48:54 
192:03:23 
PLANNED TIME 
(HR:MIN :SEC) 
105:08:57 
106:15:00 
108:38:57 
137:20:22 
152:20:22 
176:50:32 
188:50:32 
191:50:32 
192:04:27 
VIFF 
(MIN: SEC) 
+13: 58 
+ 7: 08 
+12: 0 4 
+16:06 
-00:35 
-01:38 
-01:04 
14 
2.0 ANOMALY LISTING 
~IlIS SECTION CONTAINS A LISTING OF ANOMALIES OR PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE MISSION. THEY 
ARE LISTED ACCORDING TO LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SPACECRAFT (COMMAND/SERVICE MODULE AND LUNAR 
MODULE) • ThE GROUND SYSTEM SUPPORTING THE APOLLO 10 COUN?DOWN AND LAUNCH PERFOR!-1ED SATIS-
FACTORILY AND THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT ANOMALIES. 
LAUNCH VEHICLE (MSFC) 
2.1.1 
2.1. 2 
2.1. 3 
2.1. 4 
FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN2 PURGE DUCT S-IVB OSCILLATIONS 
S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNO~UlT, OPERATION 
S-IVB APS MODULE HELIUM LEAK 
SPACECRAFT - COMMAND/SERVICE MODULE (MSC) 
2.2.1 
2.2.2 
2.2.3 
2.2.4 
2.2.5 
2.2.6 
2.2.7 
2.2.8 
2.2.9 
2. 2.10 
2.2.11 
2.2.12 
2. 2.13 
2. 2.14 
2. 2.15 
2. 2.16 
2.2.17 
2. 2.18 
2. 2.19 
CM RCS HELIUM LEAK 
CH Res OXIDIZER LINE BURST DIAPHRAGM FAILURE 
PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT 
WATER PROBLEM 
LOW PRESSURE FROM WATER GUN 
THERMAL COATING ON FORWARD HATCH F~ED OFF 
TUNNEL WOULD NOT VENT 
SIMPLEX-A NOT OPEP~TING 
eM P~NDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILED TO OPERATE 
CM SEQUENCE CAMERA 
~_~L CELL 1 AC CIRCUIT BP~~~ER OPEN 
CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS - FUEL CELL 2 
CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF 
OVERPRESSURE OF &~CTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE VALVE CLOSED 
EDS MODULE LIGHT BULBS FAILED INTERMITTENTLY 
ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM STOPPED SCRIBING WHEN INITIALIZED 
VHF BEACON ANTENNA DID NOT DEPLOY 
TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CFARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE 
SLOW-DOWN OF ONBOARD TAPE RECORDER DURING ENTRY 
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2.2.20 
2.2.21 
2.2.22 
2.2.23 
2.2.24 
EVA STRUT BRACE NOT IN STOWED POSITION FOR LAUN~H 
GYRO DISPL~Y COUPLER PERFOP~CE 
CHLORINE AMPULE LEAKAGE 
DIGITAL EVENT TIMER MISCOUNTS 
SUIi' HEAT EXCHANGER WICK DIFFICULT 'ro SERVICE 
LUNAR MODULE 
2.2.25 
2.2.26 
2.2.27 
2.2.28 
2.2.29 
2.2.30 
2.2.31 
2.2.32 
2.2.33 
2.2.3~ 
2.2.35 
~. ~. 16 
2.2.37 
2.2.38 
2.2.39 
2.2.40 
2.2.41 
CREW REPORTED Ll-l WATER CONTAINED AIR 
HIGH NOISE L~VEL IN LM CABIN 
YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT ERROR 
INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES 
BACKUP VOICE NOISE ON OMNI IN REVOLUTION 13 
DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA 
DPS GIMBAL DRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED 
COMMANDERS OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM HEATER LIGHT DID NOT COME ON 
LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING 
OPTIC~ SYSTEM PROBLEMS 
ABNORMAL RISE IN CO INDICATIONS ON PRIMARY LIOH CARTRIDGE 
LM CABIN DEPRESSURI~ED AT FINAL SEPARATION 
CAMERA FAILURES 
FAILURE TO GET ADEQUATE DATA DUMPS 
APS LOW LEVEL INDICATIONS 
LEFT-HAND HEAD STRUT LOCKOUT HANDLE 
FLASHING LIGHT FAILURE 
GROUND SYSTEMS 
NONE 
_____ ~-______ ,_--.--.... '5tD--_____ ..... ' ..... _ ... _-= ___ ! ..... *~~1iI~_ .... '\.W~~..-. .. , ... -...' , 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.1.1 TITLE: FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN2 PURGE DUCT 
SYSTEM: IU 
SUBSYSTEM: ECS 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
E.VENT TIME: T-B: 57 
PROBLEM: ~FTER SWITCHOVER FROM AIR TO GN , A REDUCTION WAS OBSERVED IN PRESSURE IN THE IU/S-IVB 
PURGE GASES. THE PRESSURE TRAN~DrrCER READING ON THE RTG COOLING NOZZLE DECREASED FROM 
0.)7 PSIG AT T-9:00 TO ALMOST ZERO GAGE PRESSURE AT T-B:30. THE CORRESPONDING GROUND 
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) FLOWRATE INCREASED FROM AN INITIAL VALUE OF 200 LB/MIN TO AN OF~­
SCALE VALUE OF MORE THAN 225 LB/MIN. THE UPSTREAM INLET PRESSURE DECREASED FROM 2.15 PSIG 
TO 1. 66 PSIG. THE LOW PRESSURE AT '1'HE INLET TO THE RTG NOZZLE INDICl'TED LOSS OF FLOW 
THROUGH THE NOZZLE. THE INCREASE IN FLOWRATE FP.OM T3E GSE WITH i\ CORRESPONDING DECREASE 
IN INLET PRESSURE INDICATED THAT AN OPENING HAD OCCURRED SOMEWHEHE IN THE PURGE DUCTING. 
THE ECS PURGE SYSTEM CONTINUED TO FUNCTION ADEQUATELY AS INDICATED SO{ A STABLE COMPARTMENT 
TEMPERATURE; THE DUCT FAILURE WAS ASSESSED AS NON-CRITICAL FOR THE APOLLO 10 LP.UNCiI, AND 
THE COUNTDOWN PROCEEDED. 
ACTION: 
MSFC TESTS INDICATE THE ECS AIR/GN PURGE DUCT HAD A MASSIVE GAS LEAK AT THE DUCT JOINT 
APPROXIM;.TELY 4 INCHES INSIDE THE §TAGE SKIN. THIS JOINT CONSIS~ED OF A FIBERGLASS DUCT 
WHICH FIT OVER A SHORT METAL DUCT STUB ATTACHED TO THE IU SKIN. THE FIBERGLASS DUCT WAS 
RETAINED BY A MARMAN CLAMP, WHICH WAS ~nRQUED TO 7~1 INCH-POUNDS. 
AS A RESULT OF THE MSFC TESTS, A SECOND MARMl\N CLAMP WILL BE ADDED, AND BOTH CLAMPS WILL 
BE TORQUED TO 20+2INCH-POUNDS. THIS CONFIGURATION HAS BEEN TESTED TO 9 TIMES TIlE NORMAL 
OPERATING PRESSU'RE WITH NO FAILURES. THIS CHANGE (IrlH ECP 1905) HAS BEEN COMPLETED ON 
APOLLO 11, AND IT WII.L BE ACCOMPLISHED ON ALL Sl1BSEQUEN'l' LAUNCH \EHICLES. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 
RErEREHCES: MSFC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 4,5 
APOLLO 11 :FRR 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
) . 
TITLE: 
NOZZLE 
NOZZr;a SUPPORT 
STRUCTURE 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMALY 2.1.1 
FAILURE OF In AI'R/GN., PURGE DUCT 
RTG 
CAS1~ 
LH 
TAPE, 
NEW DUCTING , 
~REFLIGHT AIR/GN2 PURGE SYSTEM 
FLEX TUBING ASSV 
( E NV 1 RONt£NT AL 
CONTROL Dl!CTS) 
~~~':.:_:',-:::'.~i.~; I, :- ---- ----- .~ 1 ~--;'1/' ' ..-;.s.-_~ 
J c-~~~"::~- .:--:.----
_=~ ___ -- .~=~ ___ ==---_-_ ~9-~ic~~~:~LE 
J-.-:...::-:;;:;:::;.;.-:;";:;:;;~:;'; • • - s; -124-M3 LAUNCH VEHI CLE 
ACCELEROf£TER E~ECTRONIC PLAlr-ORK DIGITAL COff'UTtR 
GAS 8EARING ASSY ASSY AC POWER 
HEAT SUPPL Y 
EXCHAHGER 
FIGURE 2.1.1-1 
RTG COOLING DUCT/NOZ.li&_ INSTALLATIO":' 
:is 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL V 2 • 1. 1 
TITLE; FAILURE OF IU AIR/GN 2 PURGE DUCT 
f'IGURE 2.1. ~-2 IU AIH/GN 2 PURGE DUCT DETAILS 
JOINT WHICH ACCESS 
APPARENTLY FAILED ----~~~~--~OO~O~R--·:I~~~~;S~~~7'j~~~~~ 
···_,._--n--------
COOLANT PUMP 
A~)SEMBL V 
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ANOMAL Y RE PORT 
NO. 2.1. 2 TITLE: S-IVB OSCILLATIONS 
SYSTEM: S'-IVB MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 0: 09 AND 2: 39 SUBSYSTEM: PROPULSION 
PROBLEM: 
ORGArUZATION: 
REFERENCES: 
DURING THE FIRST S-IVB BURN, 19 HERTZ LONGITUDINAL OSCILLA1'IONS OF APPROXINATELY 
+0.25 G WERE OBSERVED AT THE ENGINE GIMBAL BLOCK. A SLIGH'r CHANGE IN OSCILLATORY 
THRUST, DERIVED FROM CHAMBER PRESSURE, WAS ALSO EVIDENT DU.RING THIS TIME PERIOD. 
A REVIEW OF THE APOLLO 8 FLIGHT DATA SHOWED SIMILAR THRUST OSCILLATIONS AS ON 
APOLLO 10, BUT AT APPROXIMATELY 1/2 THE G LEVEL. THIS ACTIVI1'Y IS WITHIN THE NORNAL 
J-2 ENGINE UNCOUPLED THRUST LEVEL , AND IT DOES NOT REPRESENT CONCEPN FOR FUTURE 
APOLLO MISSIONS. 
LOW FREQUENCY, LOW AMPLITUDE VIBRATION WAS ALSO PRESEN'l' THROUGHOUT 'rHE SECOND BURN. 
SHORTLY AFTER STEP PRESSURIZATION, A PREDOMINANT HIGH FREQUENCY OSCI~LATION OF 46 
HER'l'Z OCCURRED AND REMAINED UNTIL CUTOFF. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS SEQUENTIA:G 
VENTING OF THE DUAL VENT VALVES IN THE FORWARD SKIR'l' AREA, ~vHICH TENDS TO EXCITE THE 
FORWARD SKIRT RING MODE. TESTS WERE RUN AT AEDC TO ATTEMPT TO DUFi..ICATE THE FLIGHT 
DATA. APOLLO 11 WAS NOT CONSTRAINTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON EITHER 
THE STRUCTURE OR THE VEr~TING SYSTEM DURING THE APOLLO 10 MISSION. 
5-2490 
MSFC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 5, 6 
APOLLO 11 FRR 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
------~--~ .. --~~--- --- --~ 
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TITlF: S-IVB OSCILLATIONS 
FIGURE 2.1. 2-1 
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ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 2 
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S-IVB SECOND BURN LONGITUDINAL AND LATERAL OSCILLATIONS 
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DETAIL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 2 
TITLE: S-IVB OSCILLATIONS 
FIGURE 2.1. 2-2 
APOLLO 10 (AS-50S) AND APOLLO 8 (AS-503) SECOND BURN VIBRATION COMPARISON 
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DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2 • 1. 2 
TITLE; S-IVB Of,CILLATIONS 
Di,;SCRIPTION ~ 
THE CREW Rt;PORTED A LOW FREQUENCY LATERAL AND LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATION DURING BOTH S-IVB 
BURNS, WITH A HIGHER FREQUENCY VIBRATION SUPERIMPOSED ON IT BEGINNING 4 MINUTES AND 40 
SECONDS iNTO THE SECOND BURN. LONGITUDINl.L 19 HZ OSCILLATIONS WERE EXPERIENCED DURING 
THE FI&~T BURN AT A MAXIMUM AMPLITUDE OF +0.25 G ON THE LONGITUDINAL GIMBAL BLOCK 
ACCE:UE:i~OMETER. A FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF 'lHF CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SHOWS A CHANGE IN THE 
TH:F'Sr::: OSCILLATIONS DURING THE SAME TIME OF FLIGHT. THE AS-503 S-IVB DATA SHOWED 19 HZ 
LOAGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS SIMI~~R TO AS-50S AT ABOUT ONE-HALF THE AMPLITUDE. S-IVB-201 
~JD S-IVB-204 THRUST DATA SHOWED 18-19 HZ OSCILLATIONS EQUAL IN AMPLITUDE TO AS-50S. 
LONGITUDINAL VIBRATIONS WHICH ARE RESPONSES TO UNCOUPLED THRUST OSCILLATIONS ALSO 
OCCURRED DURING S-IC AND S-II ~~INSTAGE BURNS. THE AMPLITUDE OF THE 19 HZ THRUST 
OSCILLATIONS CALCULATED FROM Pc IS WITHIN THE NORMAL J-2 UNCOUPLED THRUST LEVELS (NOISE 
LEVEL THRUST OSCILLATIONS). THE OSCILLATIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE ENGINE NOISE LEVEL 
THRUST OSCILLATIONS AND THEY ARE OF NO CONCERN FROM STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS. SIMILAR 
VIBRATION LEVELS WERE ALSO PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE SECOND BURN. 8N INCREASE IN THE PITCH 
& YAW VIBRATION LEVEL OCCURRED DURING THE SECOND BURN 4 SECONDS BEFORE THE ASTRONAUT 
COMMENT. THE PREDOMINANT FREQUENCY WAS 46 HZ WHICH REMAINED UNTIL ENGINE CUTOFF. THE 
FUEL STEP PRESSURIZATION AND VENT SEQUENCE OCCURRED 3 SECONDS BEFORE THIS VIBRATION 
LEVEL INCREASE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE PROXIMITY (0.1 PSI) OF THE DUAL VENT VALVE 
SETTINGS. 
IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE 19 HZ LONGITUDINAL VIBRATION IS A LOW LEVEL RESPONSE TO 
ENGINE THRUST OSCILLATIONS, SIMILAR TO THE VIBRATIONS EXPERIENCED BY OTHER SATURN STAGES 
DURING POWERED FLIGHT. THE 46 HZ OSCILLATION IS OF NO CONCERN WITH REGARD TO THE 
STRUCTURE OR THE VENTING SYSTEM. TESTS WERE PERFORMED AT AEDO TO ATTEHPT TO DUPLICATE THE 
46 HZ RESPONSE. COMPLETION OF THIS TESTING WAS NOT A CONSTRAINT FOR APOLLO 11. 
~-- ----------~-,-.---
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NO.2. 1. 3 
SYSTEM: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
ORGAfUZATION: 
REFERENCES: 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYD~,ULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION 
S-IVB 
HYDRAULIC 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 2: 37 
DURING THE TLI BURN AND THE PROPELLANT DUMP, THE AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP OPERATED 
ABNORMALLY. THE PUMP ~:AS CAVITATING, HEATING UP, PRESSURIZING THE SYSTEM TOO SLOWLY, 
AND DRAWING 19 AMPS INSTEAD OF THE EXPECTED 40 AMPS. DURING THE PRESSURIZATION rYCLE 
AFTER SECOND BURN AND DURING THE PROPELLANT DUMP, THE PUMP CURRENT WAS 15 TO 16 AMPERES 
AND THE SYSTEM PRESSURE WAS LESS THAN THE 1500 PSI LOWER LIMIT OF THE MEASURING SYSTEM. 
THERE WAS ENOUGH PRESSURE AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, TO CENTER THE J-2 ENGINE DURING THESE 
PERIODS. 
TESTS WITH A FAILED :OMPENSATOR SPRING GUIDE REPRODUCED THE FLIGHT DATA. THE SPRING 
GUIDES WERE REDESIGNED SOY~ TIME AGO, BUT IT IS SUSPECTED THE OLD DESIGN FLEW ON AS-50S 
THE COMPENSATOR SPRING GUIDE ON S-IVB-506 WAS REPLACED BEFORE CDDT TO INSURE ADEQUATE 
PERFORMANCE DURING THE ~~OLLO 11 MISSION. 
5-2490 
MSFC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 2-4 
APOLLO 11 FRR 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 8/ r /69 
REV: 
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DETA Il SHEET 
ANOMAL V 2. 1. 3 
TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION 
FIGURE 2.1.3-2 PRESSURE COMPENSATOR ASSEMBLY 
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DETA IL SHEET 
2.1. 3 ANOMALY 
---
TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP ABNORM~L OPERATION 
BACKGROUND: THE AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP IS A FIXED ANGLE, VARIABLE DELIVERY P::JMP WITH A RATED 
FLOW OF 1.5 GPM AT A MINIMUM OF 3,500 PSIA. THE PUMP IS DRIVEN BY A 56 VDC MOTOR 
REQUIRING EITHER A GROUND SERVICE POWER OR STAGE POWER. THE MOTOR CAVITY IS FILLED 
w~rH DRY AIR. THIS AIR MAINTAINS A POSITIVE PRESSUPE WITHIN THE MOTOR TO PREVENT 
EXCESSIVE BRUSH WEAR; IT ALSO TRANSFERS MO'I'OR-GENERATED HEAT TO THE HYDRAULIC FLUID. 
THE HEAT THERMALLY CONDITIONS THE FLUID DURING PRELAUNCH PROPELLANT LOADING OPERATIONS 
AND DURING THE ORBITAL COAST PHASE. FOR THE COAST PHASE, THE PUMP TURNS ON AT PRE-
PROGRAMMED INTERVALS FOR HEATING AND CIRCULATING THE FLUID. 
DESCRIPTION: HYDRAULIC PUMP OPERATION WAS NORMAL DURING PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES, BOOST, FIRST BURN, 
AND THROUGH SECOND BURN RESTART PREPARATIONS. 
THE AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP WAS TURNED ON 6 MINUTES PRIOR TO SECOND BURN. THE ACTUA-
TORS CENTERED THE J-2 ENGINE IN RESPONSE TO THE 3635 PSIA SYSTEM PRESSURE. AT ENGINE 
IGNITION, THE ACTUATORS RESPONDED NORMALLY TO THE APPLIED GUIDANCE SIGNALS. THE 
AUXILIARY PUMP RESPONDED BRIEFLY WITH HIGH FLOW TO MEET THIS DEMAND WHILE THE ENGINE 
DRIVEN PUMP WAS BhOUGHT UP TO S~EED. SHORTLY AFTER ENGINE IGNITION, THE ENGINE DRIVEN 
PUMP OUTPUT PRESSURE EXCEEDED THE NORMAL 3635 PSIA BY 3 PERCENT. THE AUXILIARY PUMP 
RESPONDED TO THIS EXCESS PRESSURE BY FEATHERING TO THE NO-FLOW CONDITION WITH A CORREf-
PONDING DROP TO A COl-4'fINUOUS 21 Al-tPERE DEMAND. AT ABOUT 2:37 GET, THE AUXILIARY PUMP 
CURRENT DECREASED UNEXPECTEDLY TO 19 AMPERES. THE CURRENT REMAINED AT THIS LEVEL DURiNG 
THE 4.1 SECOND INTERVAL FOLLOWING ENGINE CUTOFF INSTEAD OF RIS.eNG TO 'fHE ~ORMAL 40 TO 
70 AMPERES. 
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DETAil SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 1. 3 
TITLE: S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDr~ULIC PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATION 
ONE PRESSURIZATION ~;AS PROGRAMMED BETWEEN ~;ECOND BURN AND THE CHILL DOWN EX1?E~I­
MENT/PASSIVATION EVENT. NO MEASURABLE SYS~'EM PRESSUPB WAS OBSERVED (TRANSDUCER 
RANGE AND SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS DO NOT ALLOW DETECTION BELOW 1500 PSI). HOWEVER, 
THE ACTUATORS CENTERED THE ENGINE WHICH INDICATES THAT THE AUXILIARY PUMP PRODUCED 
SOME PRESSURE AND FLOW. 
THE LOX LEAD EXPERIMENT AND PASSIVATION WERE CONTINUED USING 'I'HE AUXILIARY PUMP TO 
CENTER THE J-2 ENGINE. DURING THIS PERIOD THE ENGINE REMAINED CENTERED, THE ENGINE 
DRIVEN PUMP INLET TEMPERATURE DECREASED STEADILY, AND RESERVOIR TEMPERATURE 
INCREASED. THESE EVENTS INDICATE THAT FLUID FLOW WAS BEING PRODUCED. THE AUXILIARY 
PUMP MOTOR CURRENT DRIFTED IN THE 15 TO 16 AMPERE RANGE DURING OPERATION UNTIL THE 
PUMP TURNED OFF BY GROUND COMMAND AT ABOUT 4948 SECONDS INTO TIME BASE 8. 
AN AUXILIARY PUMP GROUND TEST WAS RUN IN AN ATTEMPT TO DUPLICATE THE FLIGHT DATA '3Y 
INTRODUCING KNOWN FAILl~ES. THE PRIME SUSPECT, STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE COMPENSATOR 
SPRING GUIDE, DID PRODUCE SIMILAR DATA. ADD!TIONAL FAILURE TESTS (COMPENS_\TOR 
SPRING BREAKAGE, VALVE PLATE TORSION SPRING FRACTURE, AND STOP PIN FAILURE) DID NOT 
DUPLICATE FLIGHT DATA. 
THERE IS NO INDICATION OF ANY MISSION OR PROG~~ IMPA~T • 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
I NO. 2.1. 4 TITlE: S- IVB APS MODUL1~ HELIUM LEAK 
SYSTEM: S-IVB M1S<;ION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: APS EVENT TIME: 6: 30 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
THE OPERATIONS OF THE APS PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM WAS SATISFACTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
A HELIUM LEAK IN MODULE NO.1. 'rHE LEAK STARTED APPROXIMATELY 6.5 110URS AFTER LIFTOFF 
AND EXTENDED THROUGH LOSS OF DATA (10:54:00). THE LEAK RATE AT LOSS OF DATA WAS 
APPROXIMATELY 3278 SCCM (200 SCIM). 
AS A RESULT OF A SIMILAR LEAK WHICH OCCURRED ON AS-504 (APOLLO 9), FIVE "0" RINGS IN 
THE HIGH-PRESSURE HELIUM PLUMBING WERE CHANGED ON APOLLO 10 AND SUBSEQUENT. THE LEAKAGE 
RATES EXPERIENCED ON APOLLO 9 AND APOLLO 10 WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE 
S-IVB PORTION OF THE APOLLO 11 MISSION. 
ORGAfH ZATION: 5- 2 49 0 RESOLUT IOtl: CLOSED REFERENCES: APOLLO 11 FRR 
FLIGHT EVALUATION REPORT - AS-50S 
APOLLO 10 MISSION MPR-SAT-FE-69-7 
DATE: 
REV: 
TITLE: 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 1. 4 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.1 TITLE: CM RCS HELIUM LEAK 
SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME ~ PRELAUNCH SUBSyc-~iM: 
PROBLE,I: 
ACTION: 
ORGANIZATION: 
REFERENCES: 
RCS 
THE HELIUM MANIFO!.D PRESSURE IN CM RCS SYSTEM 1 BEGAN TO DECAY AT A PATE O}' 0.13 PSIA/HR 
FOLLOWING HELIUY SERVICING 3.5 DAYS PRIOR TO LAUNCH. AFTER 2.5 DAYS, 'fHE PRESSURE 
!iAD DROPPED FROM 45 TO 37 PSIA. "J"BE PRESSURE IN THE HELIUM MANIFOLDS BETWEEN THE 
PROPELLANT TANKS AND THE CHECK VALVt:;:;, WAS CHECKED; THE OXIDIZER SIDE WAS AT THE INITIl'.L 
PRESSURE, BUT THE FU1::L SIDE WAS LOW. NEI'rHER A HELIUM LEAK NOR A FUEL LEAK COULD BE 
DETECTED; HOWEVER, A FUEl .. LEAK OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO CAUSE THE PRESSURE DROP 
DEFINITELY WOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED. THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE Lm'l PRESSUru:::: HELIUM 
MANIFOLD IN THE FUEL LP-G WAS LEAKING SLIGHTJ .. Y BU'l' AT A RATE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE MISSION. 
THE SYSTEM WAS THEN REPRESSURIZED TO 49 PSIA. THE LEAK RATE DECREASED AS THE MISSION 
PROGRESSED, REACHING o. o~ PSIA/HR BY THE END OF THE. MISSION. ONLY PART OF THIS DECREASE 
RESULTED FROM THE REDUCED SYSTEM PRESSURE; THUS, THE LEAK CORRECTED ITSELF TO SOME EXTENT 
AND/OR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HELIUM CHANGED AS IT BECAME DI:LUTJ<;D BY PROPELLANT 
PERMEATING THE BLADDER. 
POSTFLIGHT TESTING OF THE COMMAND MODUEL INCLUDED A VERY 'l'HOROUGH HASS SPECTROME~ER LEAK 
CI~CK ON SYSTEM 1, AT BOTH 50 AND 285 PSI~. NO LEAKS WERE DETECTED; HOWEVER, DURING THE 
POSTFLIGHT DECONTAIUNATION PROCEDURES, CERTAIN TYPES OF LEAKS COULD BE ELIMINATED. 
FOR FUTURE MISSIONS, THE SYSTEM WILL BE PRESSURIZED TO 100 PSIA ABOUT 30 DAYS PRIOR TO 
FLIGHT TO INSURE THAT ANY LEAKS CAl~ BE DETECTED AND APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN 
PRIOR TO START OF THE LAUNCH COUNTDOWN. 
5-2490 
MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 9 RESOlUTIOrl. CLOSED DATE: 
MSC FAILURE AND &~OMALY LISTING 
REV: 
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'i i ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.2 TITLE: CM RCS OXIDIZER LINE BURST DIAPHRAGM FAILURE 
SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: RCS EVENT TIME: T-9:26 
PROBLEM: DURING THE FI~AL SWITCH LIST VERIFICATION, WHEN THE PROPELLANT ISOLATION VALVES OF THE 
COMMAND MOD~LE RCS SYSTEM WERE OPENED, THE PRESSURE IN TtiE CM RCS HELIUM SYSTEM 2 DROPPED 
FROM 44 P~IA TO 37 PSIA. THIS INDICATED THAT THE OXIDIZER PROPELLANT BURST DIAPHRAGM WAS 
RUPTURED, ALLOWING OXIDIZER TO FLOW FROM THE TANK INTO THE MANIFOLD WHEN THE ISOLATION VALVE 
WAS OPENED. THE OXIDIZER ISOLATION VALVE BACKED UP BY THE ENGINE VALVES PREVENTED LOSS OF 
OXIDIZER, AND THE SYSTEM WAS VISUALLY VERIFIED TO BE LEAK-TIGHT; THEREFORE, IT WAS DECIDED 
THAT ~HE SYSTEM WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT. THE ISOLATION VALVES WERE CLOSED AFTER ORBITAL 
INSErtTION. THE ENGINE VALVES WERE THEN OPENED BY MEANS OF THE REACTION CONTROL HEATER 
CIRCUITS, AND THE OXIDIZER WAS VENTED FROM THE MANIFOLD FOR 25 MINUTES. FOUR PERCENT OF THE 
OXIDIZER IN SYSTEM 2 WAS LOST, HOWEVER, THE MAXIMUM PREVIOUS PROPELLANT USAGE DURING A 
MISSION WA~ 35% OF ONE SYSTEM. AFTER THE MISSION, THE OXIDIZER AND FUEL BURST DISCS WERE 
SIMIlAR IN PHYSICAL APPEARANCE, INDICATING THAT THE OXIDIZER BURST DISC HAD FAILED BECAUSE 
OF PRESSURE. 
ACTION: CAU7.:'ION NOTES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO rHE PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT PROCEDURES IN THE PLACES WHERE THE 
ALLOWABLE LIMITS ON THE BURST DISC (241 +16 PSID IN THE FLOW DIRECT~ON AND 10 PSID IN THE 
REVERSE DIRECTION) COULD BE EXCEEDED. TO ALLOW EARLY DETECTION OF ANY SIMILAR PROBLEM IN 
THE FUTURE, A LEAK CHECK OF THE BURST DISC HAS BEEN ADDED AFTER REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
PROPELLANT SERVICING. 
ORGAfHZATION: 5-2490 
REFE. RENCES : MSC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 9, 15 
APOLLO 11 FRR 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, P. 1 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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DETA II. SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2-.2.2 
TITLf: CM RCS OXIDIZER LINE BURST DIAPHRAGM FAILURE 
HELIUM INTERCONNECT 
SQUIB VALVE (2 PLACES) 
Figure 2.2.2-1. CM RCS OXIDIZZR SUPPLY 
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CR2116T 
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SWITCHES 
THE BURST DII\PHRAGfoiS CONFINE THE PROPELLANTS TO AS SMALL AN 
AREA AS POSSIBLE. THEY ASSURE AGAINST DOWNSTREAM LEAKAGE OF 
PROPELLANT IS')LATION VALVES, ENGINE INJECTION VALVES OR PLUMBING. 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.3 TITLE: PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT 
SYSTEM: CM 
SUBSYSTEM: ECS 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 0: 08 AND 78: 38 GET 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
THE PRIMARY EVAPORATOR IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM BEGAN OPERATION SOON AFTER 
LIFT-OFF BUT DRIED OUT AFTER ONLY A FEW MINUTES. THE SECONDARY COOLING SYSTEM WAS ACTIVATE 
AND FUNCTIONED NOMINALLY. THE PRIMARY EVAPORATOR WAS DEACTIVATED AND WAS NOT RESERVICED 
WITH WATER UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION. IT DRIED OUT AGAIN DURING THE 
SECOND LUNAR ORBIT. JUST PRIOR TO ENTRY, THE EVAPORATOR WAS SERVICED AGAIN. DURING 
ENTRY, IT FUNCTIONED NORMALLY, BUT INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER oa 
NOT ADDITIONAL WATER WAS AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDED TO THE EVAPORATOR. 
A CHECK OF THE SWITCH ASSEMBLY REVEALED TfffiT THE ACTUATOR MOVED AS LITTLE AS 0.0008 INCH 
BEYOND THE POINT AT WHICH THE SWITCH SHOULD HAVE OPENED. WITH CHANGES IN ENVIRONMENT, THE 
ACTUATOR TRAVEL WAS AT TIMES NOT SUFFICIENT TO OPEN THE SWITCH. ACTUATOR RIGGING PROCE-
DURES WlLL BE MODIFIED TO ASSURE PROPER OV£RTRAVEL. 
ORGAIUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 10 
FRR-APOLLO 11 JUNE 17, 1969 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, 
JUNE, 1969 
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PRIMARY ECS EVAPORATOR DRIED OUT 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
til. 2.2.4 TITLE: WATER PROB ..... EM. 
SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: ECS EVENT TIME: 
~----------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------.-
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE FLIGHT, THE CREW 'TATED THAT THE GROUND-SERVICED POTABLE 
WATER CONTAINED GAS. THE TANK IS SERVICED WITH ALi{ATED WATER WHICH IS FORCED INTO 
THE SYSTEM BY NITROGEN AT APPROXIMATELY 20 PSIA. WHEN THE WATER, WHICH WAS SATURATEv WITH 
GAS AT 20 PSIA, IS DRAWN FROM THE TANK IUTO THE CABIN AT 5 PSIA, SOME GAS IS RELEASED 
FROM SOLUTION BUT RBMAINS MIXED WITH THE WATER. TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS, A TWO-COMPART-
MENT BAG WITH A HANDLE FOR WHIRLING THE BAG IN A CIRCULAR MOTION WAS PROVIDED. THIS BAG 
HAD BEEN DEVELOPED rtAPIDLY WITH INSUFFICIENT TI~£ FOR A COMPLETE TEST PROGRAM. IT DID 
NOT FUNCTION AS INTENDED In FLIGHT. 
NEW BAG DESIGNS BEING DEVELOPED SHOW MUCH IMPROVEMENT IN TESTS. A MEMBRANE DEVICE; WHICH 
ATTACHES TO THE EXIT PORT OF THE WATER GUN AND ALLOWS THE GAS TO PASS INTO THE CABIN SHOWS 
PROMISE. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ARE BEING PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE uSE ON APOLLO 11. 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: REFERENCES: MSC 5-:>AY REPORT PP. 10, 14 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1969 
___ ----------------_.~_ ..... _e~....,H aM 'W'#t'f,-""..,bla ,." ...... ..... ~~ •••. ~..t- ... .." 
REV: 
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j,' NO.2. :Y~:EM: CSM TITlE: LOW PRESSURE FROM WATER GUN 
• 
I 
• 
SUBSYSTEM: CREW SYSTEM 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 
PROBLEM: 
ACTIC'N: 
FOR ABOUT 2 HQURS ON THE SEVENTH DAY OF THE FLIGHT, THE FLOW FROM THE COMMAND MODULE 
WATER DISPEN~ER APPEARED TO BE LESS THAN NORMAL. AN O.O)-INCH ORIFICE WITHIN THF 
DISPENSER NORMALLY LIMITS FLOW TO APPROXIMATELY 6 CC/SEC (SEE FIG. 2.2.5-1). A REDUCTION 
IN FLOW AT r~HE FOOD PREPARATION PANEL COULD NOT BE VERIFIED. THE DRIVING FORCE FOR 
THE WATER IS OXYGEN AT 20 PSIA, AND THIS PRESSURE WAS NORMAL. THE LUBRICANT IS THE 
MOST LIKELY SUSPECT FOR THE CLOGGING. 
PROCESSING SPECIFICATIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED TO ASSURF TI~T EXCESS LUBRICANT IS NOT USED. 
, SHOUL:) THE ~;UN BECOME CLOGGED IN FLIGHT, SEVERAL ALTF,. ArJ.'IVES ARE AVAILABLE FOR DRINKING 
WATER. TWO GUNS ARE CARRIED ABOARD THE LUNAR MODULI, D COULD BE USED. ALSO, WATER IS 
AVAILABLE AT 'rHl: FOOD P'qEPARATION PANEL OF THE COMML . .., MODULE, AS WELL AS AT THE FIRE-
FIGHTING NOZZLE ON THE GUN (THE NOZZLE IS UPSTREAM OF THE METERING ORIFICE) . 
~~~~~----------------------------------------------------------------.----------------.------,---ORGAJUZATION: 5-2490 
REfEREHCl::S: MSC FAILURE AND AiJOMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSt"' DArt: 
REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.6 TITLE: THEru.fAL COATING ON FORWARD HATCH FLAKED OFF 
SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO .... 0 
SUBSYSTlM: STRUCTURE eVENT TIME: 3: 54 
PROBLE1·f: WHEN THE LUNAR MODULE CABIN WAi FIRST P~ESSURIZED THE THEl<MAL COATING ON THE C(jI-'..MAND 
MODULE HATCH CAME OFF IN PIECES. THE INSTTLATION BLANKET VENT HOLES WERE PLUGGED, PRO-
DUCING THE DAMAGE. ONE POSSIBILITY IS TRA'l' THE PREFLIGHT BAKING OF THE HATCH AT 900°F 
FOR 15 HOURS WEAKENED THE INSULATION TO THE EXTENT THAT INTERNAL PIECES OF INSULATION 
BROKE LOOSE AND PLUGGED THE HOLES DURING TUNNEL DEPP~~SUR!ZATION. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY 
IS THAT THE VENT HOLES WERE INADVERTENTLY SEAl.ED WHEN TH~ TNSULATION BLANKET WAS POTTED 
WITH RTV OR WHEN THE H-FILM TAPE WAS INSTALLED ON THE HATCH ~rTRFACE. 
ACTIO~l: ON THE APOLLO 11 COMMAND MODULE, ThE IN3ULATION HAS BEEN DELETED BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTS 
NOTED AND B~CAUSE A REEVALUATION OF THEfu~ CONDITIONS HAS SHOWN THAT THE INSULATION IS 
NOT NECESSARY. HOWEVER, T'J MINIMIZE CONDENSATION, A SINGLE LAYER OF H-FILM TAPE HAS BEEN 
APPLI~D OVER THE EXTERIOR SUR!ACE OF THE HATCH ABLATOR. SOME WATER AND ICE CAN BE EXPECTE 
ON APOLLO 11 BUT TO A LESSER DEGREE THAN OBSERVED ON A~OLLO 10. 
ORGAIHZATlON: 5-2490 
REfERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, 1:-'. 6 
FRR-APOLI.O 11 JUNE 17, 1969 
MSC FAILURE AND ~&OMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1909 
-------.... .Iiio 
RESOLUTllm: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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DETAIL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 6 
TITLE: THERMAL COATING ON FORWARD HATCH nAKED OFF 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO.2. 2. 7 TITLE: TUNNEL WOULD NOT VENT 
SYSTEM: CSM/LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
S'l'RUCTURE 
SUBSYSTEM: EVENT TIME: 96:27 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
THE PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL BETWEEN THE COMMAND MODULE AND THE LUNAR MODULF COULD NOT 
BE LOWERED TO AMBIEN'l' PRESSURE 'l'HROUGH 'l'HE TUNNEL VENT SYSTEM. POSTFLIl";!i'.' INSPECT ION OF 
THE \'ENT SYSTEM REVEALED THAT AN INCORRECT FITTING HAD BEEN INSTALLED ON THE VENT. THE 
PROPER PART WAS SPECIFIED IN THE INSTALLATION PROCEDURES. 
FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS, AN END-TO-END TEST WILL BE PERFORMED TO VERIFY 
THE SYSTEM. ON APOLLO 10, THIS TEST HAD BEEN WAIVED. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY DATE: 
LIS~ING JUNE 1969 
REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2 • 2 • 8 TITLE: SIMPLEX-A '.mT OPERATING 
SYSTEM: CK/LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: COMMUNICATIONS EVENT TIME: 94:46 AND 95:16 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
AT 94 HOURS 46 MINUTES, THE COMMAImER ATTEMP'fED A TRANSMISSION ON SIMPLEX-A; HOWEVER, 
THE CIRCUIT BREAKER SUPPLYING POWER FOR THE KEYING RELAY WAS OPEN, RENDERING VHF 
SI~~LEX-A INOPERATIVE. TRANSMISSION ON SIMPLEX-A WAS ATTEMPTED AGAIN AT 95 HOURS 16 
MINUTES. A CHECK OF SWITCH POSITIONS FOR BOTH SPACECRAFT WAS PERFORMED. BOTH LUNAR 
MODULE CREWMEN ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO TRANSMIT ON SIMPLEX-A. THE COMMANDER THEN 
TRI:::::D SIMPLEX-B WITH NO SUCCESS: HOWEVER, HIS SIMPLEX-B SWITCH HAD BEEN LEFT IN THE 
"RECEIVE" POSITION FROM THE PREVIOUS CHECK, AND HE COULD NOT TRANSMIT AT THAT TIME. 
THE COMMANDER THEN SWITCHED ~['Q "TRANSMIT/RECEIVE" AND SIMPLEX-B PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. 
WITH THE PRESS OF TIME, THE CREW DECIDED TO USE SIMPLEX-B. :iOWEVER, DURING THE BACKSIDE 
PASS OF REVOLUTION 11, VHF SIMPLEX-A WAS TRIED AGAIN, AND IT PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. 
THE CAn TRANSMITTER WAS USED FOR BOTH VOICE AND RANGING FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT. 
THE MOST PROBABLE CA!JSE FOR THE APPARENT FAILURES OF VHF SIMPLEX·-A WAS THE NUMEROUS SWITCH 
CONFIGURATION CHANGES IN BOTH VEHICLES. THE TWO VEHICLES WE~E NOT CONFIGURED SIMULTAN-
EOUSLY FOR COMMUNICATIONS ON SIMPLEX-A. 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUiION: CLOSED DATE: RUERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, PP. 4,11 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1969 . REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.9 TITLE: CM RENDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILED TO OPERATE 
SYSTB1: CSM MISSION: JI...POLLC 10 
SUBSYSTEM: RENDEZVOUS RADAR EVENT TIME: 98: 51 
PROBloEM: 
ACTION: 
I ORGANIZATION: ~UERENCES: 
I 
FOLLOWING UNDOCKING, THE REnDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER IN THE COMMAND .f.10DULE WOULD NOT 
OPERATE. AN EARLIER SELF-TEST HAD BEEN CONDUCTED SUCCESSFULLY. THE COMMAND NODULE 
PILOT CHECKED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND INITIATED THE SELF-TEST; ALL READINGS WERE L;ERO. 
THE THREE-POSITIO~ PWR-OFF-HEATER SWITCH WAS CYCLED TO OFF AND BACK TO PWR. THE 
TRANSPONDER THEN WORKED ~ROPERLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF ITS USE. 
DURING POSTFLIGHT TESTS OF THE 3WITCH AND WIRING, NO DEFECTS WERE FOUND, AND THE 
ANOMALY CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY CM HARDWARE. 
5-2490 
MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 14 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, P. 2 
REV: 
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TITLE: 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 9 
CM RENDEZVOUS RP~DAR TRru~SPONDER FAILED TO OPERATE 
FIGURE 2.2.9-1 RENDEZVOUS RADAR TRANSPONDER CONTROL CIRCUITRY 
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ANOMALY RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.10 TITLE: CM SEQUENCE CAMERA 
SYSTEM: CM 
SUBSYSTEM: CAMERA 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 173 
:.?ROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
AT APPROXIMATELY 173 HOURS, DURING TP~SEARTH COAST, THE CO~~ND MODULE 16-MM CAMERA 
CEASED TO OPERATE ~N THE PULSE MODE BECAUSE THE MAGAZINE INTEFLOCK MICROSWITCH FA.ILED. 
THE SWITCH WAS NOT A HIGH RELIABILITY ITEM AND FAILED BECAUSE OF INTErNAL CONTAMINATION 
AND A F}!,ULTY PLUNGER. 
HIGH RELIABILITY MICROSWITCHES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN THE CAMERAS FOR APOLLO 11 AND 
SUBSEQUENT. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOL;JTION: CLOSED DATE: RE::FEREr~CES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1969 
-.----
-------------'--____ Me. j, • .-... __ '. _____ <_.. . 
REV: 
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DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 10 
TITLE: CM SEQUENCE CAMERA 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.11 
SYSTEM: SM 
TITLE: FUEL CELL 1 AC. CIRCUI'r BRJo~AKER OPEN 
MISSION: APOLLO 7 
SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRIC POWER EVENT TIME: 120:47 
~--,--------------------------------------------------------------------.--------------------------~ PROBLE1-!: 
ACTION: 
AT 120 HOURS 47 MINUTES, A SHORT CIRCUIT IN THF AC PUMP PACKAGE OF FUEL CELL 1 CAUSED 
THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO TRIP. FUEL CELL 1 PERFO~~NCE WAS NORMAL UP TO THIS 
TIME. FIG. 2.2.11-1 SHOWS THE OBSERVED CURRENT AND VOLTAGE VARIATIONS. THE BREAKER COULD 
NOT BE RESET: THEREFORE, FUEL CELL 1 WAS REMOVED FROM THE BUS BECAUSE BOTH THE HYDROGEN 
AND THE COOLANT PUMPS WERE INOPERATIVE. THE FUEL CELL WAS THEREAFTER PLACED ON THE BUS 
ONLY WHEN ~~E SKIN TEMPERATURE DECREASED TO 370°F; THIS PROCEDURE ,LL~ THE FUEL CELL 
OPERATIVE. 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS &~D INVERTER TESTING INDICATED THAT THE FAILURE WAS A PHASE-TO-PhASE 
SHORT EITHER IN THE HYDROGEN PUMP OR IN THE GLYCOL PUMP. GLYCOL PUMPS, WHJ~H HAVE 
CANNED STATORS, HAVE NEVER FAILED ELECTRICALLY. EXCEPT FOR A MAJOR REDESIGN OF THE 
HYDROGEN PUMP, NO PROCEDUR1~ OR DESIGN CHANGES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIE0 WHICH WOULD FURTHER 
IMPROVE THE RELIABILITi OF THE HYDROGEN PUMP. 
ORGArHZATION: 5-2490 . RESOLUT ION: CLOSED REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AN~ ANOMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1969 
'------~-.. ~---. -----.~...-..-..-..- .......... -.- ,--
DATE: 
R:::V: 
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TITlE: 
DETAIL SHEET 
MOMAl Y 2. 2 • 11 
FUEL CELL 1 AC CI~CUIT B~~AKER OPEN 
------------------------- ------------------ ----
FAILURES OF THIS NATURE HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON HYDROGEN PUMPS DURING ENDURANCE TESTING 
UNDER NO~~ OPERATING TEMPERATURES. OF FIFTEEN DEVELOPMENT POWER PLANTS THAT EXHIBITED 
AN INSULATION RESISTANCE EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN THE APOLLO 10 UNIT, SIX HAD SHORTS IN THE 
HYDROGEN PUMP STATOR WINDINGS. FOUR OF THESE SIX WERE PHASE-TO-PHASE, AND THE O'l'HER TWO 
WERE PHASE-TO-GROUND. THIS KIND OF FAILURE IS CAUSED BY THE HOT, MOIST HYDROGEN FLOWING 
ACROSS THE WINDINGS; THE INSULATION IS DEGRADED AND PHASE-TO-PHASE-TO-PHASE SHORTS 
RESULT. IN THE3E TESTS, NO STATOR FAILED IN LESS THAN 1000 HOURS, AND ~HE ~~XIMUM TIME 
TO FAILURE WAS 3960 HOURS. THE UNIT FLOh"'N ON APOLLO 10 HAD OPERATED APPROXIMA'rELY 300 
HOURS. 
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MO. 2.2.12 
SYSTEM: SM 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS - FUEL CELL 2 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRIC POw"ER EVENT TIME: 134 
PROBLEM: 
AC'l'ION: 
AT 134 HOURS, ~HE CREW REPORTED THAT THE CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE ON FUEL CELL 2 
HAD BEEN CYCLING BETWEEN 149° AND 168°F AT THE RATE OF 2 CYCLES/MINUTE FOR 30 TO 40 
MINUTES WHILE THE SPACECRAFT WAS BEHIND THE MOON AND THAT THE CAUTION 1.ND WARNING 
ALARM FOR LOW TEMPERATURE HAD BEEN TRIGGERED ABOUT EVERY TENTH CYCLE. THE NORMAL 
RANGE OF OPERATION IS 155° TO 165°F. THIS DATA SHOWS CYCLING EARLIBR AND LATER IN 
THE FLIGHT, BUT THE TEMPERATURE REMAINED WITHIN THE CAUTION AND WARNING LIMITS. 
THE FUEL CELL 2 TEMPERATURE VARIED PERIODICALLY BEFORE AND AFTER FUEL CELL 1 WAS 
REMOVED FROM THE BUS. THIS INDICATES THAT PERFORMANCE WAS ABNORMAL WELL BEFORE 
THE SUSTAINED OSCILLATIONS. 
THE OBSERVED BEHAVIOR, ALTHOUGH ABNORMAL, IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO FJEL CF~L COMPONENT 
LIFE OR PERFORMANCE BUT DOES REPRESENT A NUISANCE TO THE CREW BECAUSE THE CAUTION 
AND WARNING MUST BE RESET MANUALLY. 
ORGAIUZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTICC JUNE 1969 
RESOI_uTION: OPEN DATE: 
REV: 
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TITLE: 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 12 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.13 
SYSTEM: SM 
TITLE: CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: ELECTRIC POWER EVENT TIME: 170: 56 
PROBLE''': 
ACTION: 
DURING THE 3-HOUR PURGE OF FUE:':' CELL 1, THE AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM WAS 
BELIEVED TO HAVE FAILED TWICE TO TURN THE HYDROGEN TANK HEATERS OFF (FIG. 2.2.13-1). AFTER 
170-1/2 HOURS, THE HEATERS WERE SWITCHED ON AND OFF MANUALLY. 
FOR AUTOMATIC OPERATION, THE PRESSURE SWITCi-IES IN BOTH TANKS MUS'r CLOSE IN ORDER TO 
ACTUATE THE HEATERS, BUT ONLY ONE PRESSURE S~ITCH MUST OPEN TO DEACTIVATE THEM 
AS SHOWN IN FIG 2.2.13-2THEHEATERS IN TANK 1 WERE IN AUTO AND THOSE IN TANK 2 WERE IN 
OFF BEFORE THE PURGE WAS STARTED. ALSO, THE :?RESSURE SWITCH FOR TANK 1 WAS OPEN AND THAT 01 
TANK 2 WAS CLOSED. SHORTLY AFTER THE PURGE l'lAS STARTED, THE HENrERS IN ':i'ANK 1 WERE 
SWITCHED TO OFF AND IN TANK 2 TO AUTO: THIS CHANGE WAS MADE TO BALANCE THE QUANTITY IN 
THE TWO TANKS. AFTER 5 MINUTES OF PURG1NG, THE PRESSURE SWITCH IN TANK 1 CLOSED AT 236 
PSIA, ACTIVATING THE HEATERS IN TANK 2 AND AFFECTING PRESSURES IN THE MANNER EXPECTED. 
SINCE THE PRESSURE IN TANK 1 CONTINUED TO DROP AND A MASTER ALARM WAS RECEIVED, THE HEATERS 
IN TANK 1 WERE TURNED TO AUTO. AS SHOWN IN FIG 2.2 .13-l,THE PRESSURES WERE AT A MAXIMUM OF 
8 PSIA ABOVE THE SWITCHING LEVEL WHEN THE HEATERS WERE MANUALLY ~:URNE~ OFF. 
THE TRANSDUCERS ON APOLLO 10 WERE SUBJECTED TO TEMPERATURES BETWEEN MINUS 100 0 A~D MINUS 
140°F DURING THE EXTENDED PURGE; THE TRANSDUCER OUTPUT DRIFTED UPWARD AND CREATED AN 
APPARENT LOSS OF AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL. LONG-DURATION PURGES WILL NOT BE PERFORMED 
ON FUTURE FLIGHTS. THE APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK HAS BEEN Ca~NGED APPROPRIATELY. 
ORGAIHZATION: 5-2490 RESO~UTIOrj: CLOSED DATE: REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING 
REV: 
J I 5, J 
TITLE: 
DETAIL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 13 
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.~ 
'" a. 
~ 
!:: ;;; 
'" IV 
ct 
270 
2&0 
250 
r---. !oo... 
-
240 
, 
100. 
Activate 1 and 2 --
230 
Tank 1 AUTO 
I I 
220 Tank 2 OFF 
210 
165 166 
I 
r 
Deactivate 2 ~-
I I 
I I 
DeactIvate 1 
--
r--
" 
r---.. 
.-'-'.. 
r----.. 
r--..... 
· ;OFF 
i I 
lAUTO 
· 
· 
167 
Purge ~ 
• J I I , I E Master alarm 
.110. 
. / " "'- V rTank 2 V ~ 
1-- ..... -f--~--- -~ ~ ... --~ ~ 
-
-- --.L .. h. ~ "~r-- I ~Io.=.-
'I i/ i\. .. l)-Tank 17 ' ...... I t [,7 I \ / 
! { l- f-
--
! 
/ 
! ~ ...... · 
· lAUTO :AUTO ~OFF lOFF' 
n ! I I : I . 
A.UTO 10FF lAUTO lOFF ! 
· 
i . · . 
168 169 170 171 
Time, hr 
.-
l-
'" ....... ~ "-, 
" 
, 
I 
I 
172 173 
FIG. 2.2.13-1 HYDROGEN PRESSURES DURING APPARENT FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL 
• ______ ~_._. _ .... _ .. ! 'Met. t .... _ ., ...... _ .......... ~~""~. '~-" 
58 
TITLE: 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 13 
CYROGENIC HYDROGEN AUTOMATIC HEATER CONTROL FAILURE TO TURN OFF 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.14 
SYSTEM: SM 
TITLE: OVERPRESSURE OF REACTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE 
VALVE CLOSED MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: 
PROBLEl4: 
EVENT TIf.1E: 169:56 
AT 166 HOURS 49 MINUTES, THE SKIN TEMPERA'I'URE OF FUEL CELL 1 \iAS 420 0 F, AND A CONT INUOU S 
HYDROGEN PURGE WAS INITIATED TO REDUCE THE CONCENTRATION OF WATER IN THE ELECTROLYE. 
r.'HREE HOURS LATER, THE FUEL CELL WAS SUFFICIENTLY DRY AND HOT, THE PURGE WAS TERMINA'!'ED, 
AND THE HEATER FOR THE HYDROGEN VENT LINE WAS TURNED OFF. HOWEVER, HYDROG~N FLOW TO rHE 
FUEL CELL DECAYED VERY SLOWLY (FIG.2.2.14-1),NORMALLY,FLOW DECAYS TO ZERO IN LESS THAN 1 
MINUTE. THE PURGE VALV~ WAS REOPENED, AND THE FLOW RATE INCREASED TO THE UPPER LIMIT, 
INDICATING THAT THE PURGE VALVE WAS FUNCTIONING. THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AGAIN BUT THE 
FLOW DECREASE WAS STILL VERY SLOW. AS THE FLOW RATE WAS APPROACHING ZERO AFTER ABOUT 
3D MINUTES, THE REGULATED HYDROGEN PRESSURE FOR THE FUEL CELL BEGAN TO INCREASE 
REACHING A MAXIMUM 'OF 72 PSIA BEFORE SLOWLY DECAYING TO THE NORMAL 6~ PSIA. 
AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.14-2 ,THE REGULATOR OPEPATION DEPENDS rlN A REGULATED NITROGEN REFEREN( E. 
PRESSURE. THE NITROGEN PRESSURE DID NOT CHANGE DURING THE HYDROGEN PRESSURE EXCURSION, 
ACTION: 
NOR DID THE REGULATED OXYGEN PRESSURE, ELIMINATING THE POSSIBILITY OF A REFERENC~ PFESSURE 
CHANGE. 
GROUND TES~S DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EXTENDED HYDROGEN P~RGE IN FLIGHT CREATED LOW TEMPERATUREE 
ON THE REGULATOR; THE CONSEQUENT REGULATOR LEAKAGE EXPLAINS THE CONTINUED FLOW. WITH THE 
HEATER OFF, TIm VENT LINE BECAME BLOCKED, LEADING TO THE INCREASE IN REGULATED HYDROGEN 
PRESSURE. 
FOR FUTURE MISSIONS, EXTE~DED HYDRGGEN PURGlNG FROM CRYOGENIC TANKS WILL NOT BE PERFORMED. 
FOR A GREATER MARGIN OF OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE, THE VENT LINE HEATER WILL BE LEFT ON FOR 
10 MINUTES AFTER TERMINATION OF A HYDROGEN PURGE. THIS CHA~lGE HAS BEEN INCGRPORATED INTO 
THE APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK. 
ORGAIHZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED 
REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING DATE: 
REV: 
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TITLE: 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 14 
OVERPRESSURE OF REACTANTS IN FUEL CELL 1 WHEN PURGE VALVE CLOSED 
Hydrogen 
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FIG. 2.2.14-2 FUEL CELL HYDROGEN SYSTEM 
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ANOMAl Y RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.15 TITLE: EDS MODULE LIGHT BULBS FAILED INTERMITTENTLY 
SYSTEM: CM 
SUBSYSTEM: EDS 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: PRE-LAUNCH 
PROBLEl .. : 
ACTION: 
DURING SPACECRAFT TESTING PRIOR TO LAUNCH, THE LAUNCH VEHICLE ENGINE WARNING INDICATORS 
OPERATED INTERMITTENTLY. THE INDICATOR FOR EACH OF THE FIVE ENGINES HAS TWO REDUNDANT 
MINIATURE LAMPS, AND ONE LAMP IN FOUR OF THE INDICATORS WAS INTERMITTENT. 
POSTFLIGHT, ONLY THREE OF THE FOUR LAMPS WERE INTERMITTENT. THE ANNUNCIATOR WAS REMOVED 
PROM THE SPACECRAFT AND DISASSEMBLED. ON SIX OF THE TEN LAMPS, INCLUDING THE FOUR INTER-
MITTENT ONES, COLD-SOLDER JOINTS WERE FOUND WHERE THE L~~P LEAD WAS ATTACHED TO THE PRINTED\ 
CIRCUIT BOARD. THE COLD-SOLDER JOINT WOULD HAVE CAUSED INTERMITTENT LAMP OPERATION. 
THERE ARE ALSO THREE OTHER STATUS LIGHTS IN EACH ANNUNCIATOR: LAUNCH VEHICLE OVERRATE, 
S-II SEPARATION, AND LAUNCH VEHICI.E GUIDANCE FAIL. THE SIX BULBS IN THESE LIGHTS WERE 
NOT INTERMITTENT PRIOR TO LAUNCH NOR WEf'E ANY FAULTS FOUND IN THEM DURING POSTFLIGHT 
EXAMINATION. 
THE UNITS FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT VEHICLES HAVE BEEN SCREENED, WHEREAS THE APOLLO 10 
UNIT HAD NOT BEE~. 
OPGAfU ZATlON: 5-2 4 90 RESOLUTIOtl: CLOSED DATE: I 
I 
kHERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING 
REV: 
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TITLE: EDS MODULE LIGHT BULBS FAILED INTERMITTENTLY 
------------ .--.--
I/J.._- RTV-ID2 
i\"'-- \," 
Terminal post -./ \ Lamp leads~~~ .. 
64 
FIG. 2.2.15-1 LAMP ASSEMBLY 
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SYSTEM: CM 
SUBSYSTEM: EMS 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM STOPPED SCRIBING WHEN INI~IALIZED 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 190:30 
PROBLEM: THE S'l'YLUS OF THE ENTRY MONITOR STOPPED SCRIBING WHILE THE SCROLL WAS BEING DhIVEN TO THE 
ENTRY PATTEF..N FOLLOWING Pc SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE PRE-ENTRY 'I'ES'l'S. THE SCROLL 
~CTIOH: 
WAS SLEWED BACK AND FORTH, A~D 'l'HE STYLUS BEGAN TO CUT THROUGH THE EMULSION ON THE 
SCROLL. THE TFACE OF ACCELERATION VERSUS VELOCITY WAS NORMAL THROUGHOUT ENTRY. 
THE EMULSION USED ON THE SCROLL FILM IS A LATE;: RUBBER/SOAP BASE. THE FORMULATION OF 
THE SOAP, MilCH WAS COMMERCIALLY PROCURED, WAS RECENTLY CHANGED WITH URIC ACID BEING 
ADDED. THIS .;U)DITION CAUSES THE EMU:'3~ON TO HARDEN BY A CHEMICAL REACTION WITH THE 
GELATINOUS FILM ON THE MYLAR SCROLL. 
NO CHANGE WAS PLANNED FOR APOLLO 11 OR 12, HOWEVER, FOR SUBSEQUENT VEHICLES, EITHER 
THE SCROLL EMULSION BASE WILL BE MADE USING THE ORIGINALLY FORMULATED SOAP OR PRESSURE-
SENSITIVE PAPER WHICH WAS RECENTLY QUAI,IFIED WILL BE USED FOR TliE SCROLL. 
ORGAlUZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: APOLLO! 0 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
HO. 2.2.17 
SYSTEM: CM 
TITLE: VHF BEACON ANTENNA bID NOT DEPLOY 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 192:03 SUBSYSTEM: TELECOMMUNI':;ATIONS 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
THE VHF RECOVERY BEACON ANTENNA DID NOT PROPERLY DEPLOY. RECOVERY PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 
THAT THE RADIATING ELEMENT AND THREE GROUND-PLANE RADIALS WERE NOT PROPERLY DEPLOYED. 
HOWEVER, RF SIGNALS FROM THE BEACON WERE RECEIVED BY THE RECOVERY FORCES. 
THE ANTENNA DID NOT DEPLOY BECAUSE ONE RADIAL WA.S CAUG3T UNDER THE OUTBOARD EDGE OF 
RAMP SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.17-1. 
NO CHANGE IS REQUIRED FOR APOLLO 11; HOWEVER, AN ENGINEERING S'rUDY HAS t.-EEN INITIATED 
TO CONSIDER MODIFICATION OF THE RAMP. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 ESC 
REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANO~lALY LISTING R ILUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
-------------- ------ --
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rITLE: 
DETA Il SHEET 
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VHF BEACON ANTENNA DID NOT DEPLOY 
IT Radiating U element 
\ 
Rotate entire assembly 
down 90° for stowage 
FIG. 2.2.17-1'VHF RECOVERY BEACON ANTENNA DEPLOYED 
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ANOMALY RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.18 
SYSTEM: eM 
SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
TITLE: 'I'WO RETAINING SPRINrs ON TUNNEL CHARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
E"ENT TIME: 108:24 
PROBLEI~: THE MINUS Y CHARGE H0LDER RING WAS NOT CAP'r~JRED BY THE RETENTION SPRINGS, WHILE THE 
PLUS Y HOLDER WAS CAPTURED (FIG. 2. 2.18-1). ALTHOUGH THE HOLDER vIAS NOT CAPTURED, IT REMAINEL 
IN A POSITION ABOVE THE GROOVE, RESTING ON TOP OF THE SPRINGS WITHIN A NONHAZARDOUS EN-
VELOPE AREA. 
EVEN THOUGH THE TWO CHARGE HOLDER SEGMENTS ARE RESTRAINED AT ONE END, THERE IS A REMOTE 
POSSIBILITY OF A FREE CHARGE HOLDER DAMAGING THE FABRIC COMPONENTS OF THE EARTH LANDING 
SYSTEM. AS A RESULT OF ONE OF THE HOLDERS ON APOLLO 9 COMING FROM THE GROOVE AND BEING 
IN THE HAZARDOUS ENVELOPE, FOUR SPRING RETENTION DEVICES WERE INSTALLED ON l~OLLO 10 TO 
INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF CAPTURING THE CHARGE HOLDERS. 
A MARGINAL SITUATION EXISTED ON APOLLO 10 SINCE TWO OF THE SPR1NGS CAPTURED AND THE OTHER 
TWO DID NOT. A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL AREA WILL MAKE 
THE RING FOLLOW THE TUNNEL. ALTHOUGH THE PRESSURE WAS WORSE ON APOLLO 10 TlmN IT WILL BE 
FOR A NORMAL SEPARATION, THE MATH MODEL ITSELF DOES NOT INDICA'I'E 'I'HAT THE SI'l'UAT10N WILL 
BE MARKEDLY IMPROVED. TESTING WITHOUT ANY PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL HAS SHOWN THAT THE SPRINGS 
WILL WORK. 
ORGAfUZATION: 5- 2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED 
REFERE'iCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING DAlE: 
REV: 
, 
'--\6-8-1 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 18 
TITLE: TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CHARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CAPTURE 
ACTION: BASED ON THE APOLLO 10 FLIGHT EXPERIENCE, GROUND TESTS, AND PJ~ALYTICAL RESULTS, THERE IS 
STILL A PROBABILITY THAT THE SPRINGS WILL NOT CAPTURE. THE PROBABILI'rY OF CAPTURE MAY BE 
HIGHER ON APOLLO 11 THAN IT WAS ON APOLLO 10. IN ANY EVENT, ~HE RISK OF A CATASTROPHIC 
FAII.URE IS EXTREMELY SMALL. THE CHARGE HOLDERS ARE UNLIKELY TO DETACH COMPLETELY l.ND, 
THEREFORE, CANNOT CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE TO THE PARACHUTES. THE POSSIBILITY OF }\ • .3RASION OF A 
RISER LINE EXISTS; BUT, BASED ON ANALYSIS AND THE EXPERIENCE OF APOLLO 9 AND APOLLO 10, 
THIS ALSO IS SMALL. 
ON IN-LINE VEHICLES, A BETTER MEANS OF RETAINING THE CHARGE HOLDER IS BEING STUDIED. 
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TITLE : 
DETAIL SHEET 
ANOMALY 2. 2 • 18 
TWO RETAINING SPRINGS ON TUNNEL CHARGE HOLDER RING DID NOT CA~TURE 
S! a --
FIG. 2.2.18-1 CHARGR HOLDER RETENTION 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.19 
SYSTEM. CM 
TITLE: SLOW-DOWN OF ONBOARD TAPE RECORDER DURING ENTRY 
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: RE-EN'I'RY 
PROBLEM: THE DATA STORAGE EQUIPMENT EXPERIENCED LOSS OF DATA THREE TIMES DURING ENTRY, WHICH RESULTED 
IN A LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 33 SECONDS OF RECORDED PCM DATA AND 2 SECONDS OF RECORDED VOICE DATA. 
TESTING OF THE RECORDER HAS REVEALED THAT AN OUTSIDE-TO-INSIDE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL OF 2.25 
PSI IS SUFFICIENT TO DEFORM THE COVER, CAUSING IT TO CONTACT THE TAPE REELS. 
THE RECORDER VENT VALVE IS SPECIFIED TO OPERATE AT 2.0 +0.5 PSI DIFio'ERENTIAL PRESSURE. AC-
CEPTANCE TEST DATA ON THE APOLLO 10 VENT VALVE SHO~S A CRACKING PRESSUP~ OF 2.40 PSID. 
HOWEVER, THIS PRESSURE DEFORMED THE COVER SUFFICIENTLY TO CONTACT THE REEL AND SLOW IT. 
ACTION: AN IN-LINE CHANGE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO SELECT VALVES THAT CRACK ON THE LOW SIDE OF THE 
SPECIFICATION TO INSURE NO RECURRENCE OF THIS PROBLEM. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED 
REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING DATE: 
REV: 
.-... ----------~---.-.-~ .. --. 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.20 TIRE: EVA STRUT BRACE NOT IN STOWED POSITION FOR LAUNCH 
SYSTEM: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
CM 
EVA 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: LAUNCH 
PROBLEM: THE STABILIZER,.WHICH MAINTAINS COUCH POSITIONING WHEN THE FOOT STRUT OF THE CENTER COUCH 
IS REMOVED, WAS CONNECTED DURING THE LAUNCH (FIG.2.2.20-1). THE STABILIZER SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
IN THE STOWED POSITION TO ALLOW STROKING OF THE COUCH STRUTS FOR AN ABORT LANDING. THE 
CREW PROPERLY STOWED THE STABILIZER PRIOR TO ENTRY. 
ACTION: A SPECIFIC MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE PREINGRESS CHECKLIST FOR SUBSE-
QUENT MISSIONS. 
ORGA'UZATION5-2490 
REFERENCESMSC SUMMARY OF MISSION PROBLEMS 
TECHNICAL DEBRIEFING 
APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED LJATE: 
REV: 
I I 72 I 
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EVA STRUT BRACE NOT IN STOWED POSITION FOR LAUNCH 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO.2. 2.21 
SYSTEM: CM 
TIRE: GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER PERFORMANCE 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: MISSION SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMEN'l'ATION 
PROBLEM: THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WAS REPORTED TO DRIFT EXCBSSIVELY IN ROLL AND YAW (APPROXIMATELY 
5 DEGREES IN 20 MINUTES). ATTITUDES DISPLAYED BY THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER AND THE INERTIAL 
MEASUREMENT UNIT WERE COMPARED AFTER EARTH ORBITAL INSERTION, INDICATING DIFFERENCES OF 
LESS THAN 0.1 DEGREES IN ALL AXES. THESE VALUES AND CREW COMMENTS INDICATE PROPER PERFOR-
MANCE EARLY IN THE MISSION. 
A SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE STABILIZATION AND COPTROL SYSTEM SHOWING THE FUNCTIONS 
OF THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER AND THE SPACECRAFT CONTROL LOOPS IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.21-1. ON~ 
OF THE TWO GYRO }$SEMBLIES PROVIDES ONLY RATE INFORMATION AND IS NOR~LY USED TO DRIVE 
THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER. THE OTHER GYRO ASSEMBLY CAN PROVIDE EITHER RAT~ OR ATTITUDE 
ERROR, AT CREW OPTION, AND CAN BE SELECTED TO DRIVE THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER. 
-THE APOLLO 10 GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WAS DRIVEN BY BOTH GYRO ASSEMBLIES, AND THE CREW 
REPORTED SIMILAR INDICATIONS FROM EACH, THEREFORE ISOLATING THE CAUSE OF THE DRIFT TO THE 
GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER. 
THE SPECIFICATION FOR THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER CONTAINS ALLOWABLE 
TIONS FOR AT~ITUDE AND TRANSLATION MANEUVERS, FOR ASCENT, AND FOR 
CONTAIN AN ALLOWABLE VALUE FOR LONG-TERM CONSTANT ATTITUDE DRIFT. 
IS CONSIDERED REASONABLE FOR THE SYSTEM. 
ATTITUDE DISPLAY DEVIA-
ENTRY. IT DOES NOT 
A VALUE OF 10 DEG/HOUR 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUT ION: CLOSED DATE: REFERENCES: MSC SUMMARY OF MISSION PROBLElotS 
TECHNICAl- DEBRIEFINGS 
CREW BRIEFI:~G 
APOLLO 10 ~ISSION FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING 
------------------.. --.----.-----~-~ . ., .. - -- '-''' . 
REV: 
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DETAIL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 21 
----"--------------------------------
TITLE: GYRO DISPLAY COUPLE~ PERFORMANCE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTION: THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER IS NOT USED TO CONTROL ANY SPACECRAFT MANEUVERS. IF THE INERTIAL 
ME.I'SUREMENT SYSTEM IN THE PRIMARY GUIDANCE FAILS, THE CREW CAN MANUALLY MANEUVER TO THE 
DESIRED INERTIAL ATTITUDE AND THEN ALLOW THE STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM TO AUTO-
MATICALLY MAINTAI~ ATTITUDE. TO MINIMIZE DRIFT EFFECT WHEN THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER IS TO 
BE USED FOR A MANEUVER, IT SHOULD BE ALIGNED AS NEAR IN TIME TO THE MANEUVER AS IS PRACTICABLE 
THE TWO GYRO ASSEMBLIES AND THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WERE REMOVED FROM THE SPACECRAFT 
AND RETURNED TO THE VENDOR FOR INDIVIDUAL ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND A SYSTEM TEST. 
ALL THREE UNITS PASSED INDIVIDUAL TESTS WITH NO DISCREPANCIES WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED 
THE REPORTED INFLIGHT PERFORMANCE. THE GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER WAS THEN OPERATED ALONE WITH 
THE INPUTS SET AT ZERO. i'RIFT RATES WERE 2, 4, AND 1 DEG/HR FOR PITCH, YAW, AND ROLL, 
RESPECTIVELY. A GYRO PACKAGE WAS THEN CONNECTED, AND THE SYSTEM WAS OPERATED ON A TEST 
STAND. UNDER QUIESCENT OPERATION, WITH NO GYRO INPUTS, THE PERFORMANCE WAS THE SAME AS 
THAT RECORDED ABOVE. FINALLY, A RUN WAS MADE SIMULATING PASSIVE THERMAL CONTRC', IN WHICH 
A 20 DEG/HR ROLL RATE WAS INTRODUCED. THE DRIFTS RECORDED w"'ERE 5. 1 AND 5. 0 DEG/HR FOR 
PI~CH AND YAW, RESPECTIVELY. THE DRIFT RATES EXPERIENCED DURING THESE TESTS ARE NOT 
INDICATIVE OF THE PERFORMANCE REPORTED INFLIGHi'. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ACTUAL DIVERGENCE 
OF THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR WAS NOT AS RAPID AS IT APPEARED BECAUSE NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO 
MEASURE DRIFT ACCURATELY. 
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TITLE: GYRO DISPLAY COUPLER PERFORMANCE 
-------
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------~-------------------------. 76 FIG. 2.2.21-1 STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
ANOMALY REPORT 
r«l.2.2.22 
SYSTEM:CM 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
TInE: CHLORINE AMPULE LEARAGE 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TlME: 
PROBLEM: DURING ONE CHLORINE INJECTION, CHLORINE SOLUTION LEAKED FROM THE FITTING AND THE BUFFER 
AMPULE WOUY.D NOT BACk-FILL WITH WATER WHEN THE PLUNGER WAS UNSCREWED. 
ACTION: THE FLIGHT Al-'PULES USED AND UNUSED, WEFE EXAMINED FOt{ DEFECTS, AND NO ANOMALOUS CONDI'frONS 
WERE FOUND. 
THE PROBLEM WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY A PROCEDURAL ERROR; THE NEEDLE WAS No'r FULLY INSERTED 
INTO THE RUBBER GLAND AND DID NOT PENETRATE INTO ThE WATER. THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR BOTH 
THE LEAKAGE OF THE CHLORINE AND FAIl.URE TO OBTAIN WATER .£oN THE BUFFER AMPULE. 
ORGAJHZATlON: 5-2490 
REFEREHCES:APOLLO 10 MISSION FAILURE AND ANOr-:.::u,y LISTING 
MSC 30-DAY REPORT 
MSC SUMMARY OF MISSION PROBLEMS 
----------------.--------................ ""'..-..-""----~'--.-
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.23 TITLE: DIGITAL EVENT TIMER MISCOUNTS 
SYSTEM: CM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: SUBSYSTEM: 
PROBLEM: THE DIGITAL EVENT TIMER ON PANEL 1 ADVANCED A TOTAL OF 2 MINUTES DURING THE COUNTDOWN 
FOR FIRST MIOCOURSE CORRECTION. AT OTHER TIMES, THE TENS OF SECONDS FAILED TO ~VANCE. 
THE INCREMENTS OF TIME ARE ELECTRICALLY ADVANCED THROUGH A CIRCUIT ACTIVATED WHEN A CON-
DUCTOR SEGMENT CONTACTS A BRUSH IN EACH REVOLUTION OF THE UNITS WHEEL. 
THE TENS OF SECONDS PROBLEM WAS DUPLICATED POSTFLIGHT IN THE COUNTUP AND THE COUNTDOWN 
MODES. I~SPECTION DISCLOSED THAT THE UNITS WHEEL HAD BEEN RUBBED BY THE MOTOR GEAR: PAINT 
HAD FLAKED AND CONTAMINATED THE UNITS TAB AND BRUSH ASSEMBLY (SEE FIG.2.2.23-1) .CONTAMINATI0 
BETWEEN THE TAB AND-BRUSH WOULD HAVE PREVENTED ELECTRICAL CONTACT. 
ACTION: THE 2-MINUTE JUMP WAS NOT DUPLICATED, AND NO CONDITION WAS FOUND IN THE TIMER THAT COULD 
HAVE PRODUCED THE JUMP. SINCE THIS TIMER IS SENSITIVE TO ELECTRICAL NCISF., THF MOS~ 
PROBARLE CAUSZ WAS A SPURIOUS MOISE INPUT. 
A SCREENING TEST HAD BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THE TIMERS INSTALLF.D IN FUTURE SPACECRAFT: HOWEVER 
THE CAPABILITY OF THE TEST TO ISOLATE UNRELIABLE TIMERS HAS NOT YET BEEN PROVEN. 
ORGAJUZATION: 5- 2490 
REFERENCES: MSC 1:'AILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING, 
JUNE 1969 
----,--_._------' ........... ........ .... .-: ... -~.~-... --~- .... "'-.-
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE-
RL 
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TITLE: DIGITAL EVENT TIMER MISCOUNTS 
1 
,..~ 
r 
I 
S! I 
I 
I; : 
\;:1tj 
~ 
F; 
11111111 
U I I 
I 11 
0;::: 
I-
Dr 
I 
II" 11"11 liP \' 
I \ 
\ 
1 
==5 20 ::r _. c- 11) 
~ ~ c- ~ 11) 
a. 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMALY 2.2.23 
I 
:;) 
" (u; -4 (c » 11) ::l \I> 
I J 
rJg ~ ~'g 
f I~I=\ 
/' ~iI 
_ L , 
f I " ·-T \. I \ 1/ 
"- ~I 
I 'l ..... O-u 
OJ 0 OJ C-::l _. 
OJ ..... ::l 
::lOJ ..... 
a. ~. 
::l 
FIG. 2.2.23-1 DIGITAL EVENT THiER 
T 1 
--. 
J I 
0 
~ 
~ 
1 
I 
I 
79 
NO. 2.2.24 
~YSTEM: CM 
SUBSYSTEM: ECU 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: SUIT HEAT EXCHANGER wICK DIFFICULT TO SERVICE 
MISS ION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: T-3 8: 45 
PROBLEI-t: BETWEEN T-38: 45 AND T-20: 11 AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WATER WAS REQUIRED DURING THE WICK ~vETTn;( 
PROCEDURE FOR THE SUIT HEAT EXCHANGER OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT. DIFFICULTY WAS 
EXPERIENCED IN OBTAINI'·.~ COMPLETE WETTING OF THE "AIR-BLOCKING SINTERED PLATE", IN THE SUIT 
HEAT EXCHANGER. FOLLOI ~NG EACH ATTEMPT, UNACCEPTABLE GAS LEAKAGE OCCURRED. A SERVICING 
WITH WATER INJECTION F':",),:SSURE HIGHER THAN NORMAL WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING GAS BREAK-
THROUGH. THE TIME REQUIRED FOR RESERVICING OPERATIONS CAUSED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUIT 
LOOP PURGING AND SAMPLING, FINAL CREW CHECKLIST, AND COMMUNICATION TESTS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED 
DURING THE BUILT-IN HOLD AT T-9:00. 
ACTION: TEST CHANGE NOTICE CS-219 ~S BEEN ISSUED WHICH CONTAINS SERVICING PROCEDURES. THE WICK 
WILL BE LEFT WETTER AFTER THE ALTITUDE CHAMBER TESTS, AND THE WICK BREAKTHROUGH PRESSURE 
WILL BE DETERMINED. 
ORGArnZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 10 
APOLLO 11 FRR 
.-~----------.--.-.-.----~-
-
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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ANOMALY RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.25 TITLE: CREW REPORTED LM WATER CONTAINED AIR 
SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: CREW SYSTEM EVENT TIME: 
PROBLE!-!: THE cmw REPORTED THAT THE LUNAR MODULE DRINKI~G WATER CONTAINED GAS. THE NITROGEN USED 
TO PRESSURIZE THE WATER SYSTEM PERMEATES THE TANK BLADDER, AND THE WATER BECOMES SATURATED 
WITHIN 100 HOURS AFTER SERVICING. AS THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE IS REDUCED THE DISSOLVED NITROGEN 
IS RELEASED. THE FIRST WATER WI'l'HDRAWN SHOUJ ... D HAVE CONTAINED ABOUT 12 PERCENT OF GAS. AT 
STAGING, THE MIXTURE SHOULD HAVE CONTAINED 6.3 PERCENT NITROGEN BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED WATER 
TANK PRESSURE AT THAT TIME. THE WATER HOSE, WATER GUN, AND CONNECTING PLUMBING WERE NOT 
SERVICED AND THIS ENTRAPPED AIR WOULD INITIALLY ADD TO TIlE PROBLEM. 
ACTIO.J: PRELAUNCH PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO INCLUDE SERVICING THE WA'l'ER HOSE AND CONNt.:C'l'ING 
PLUMBING. 
CONSIDERlLTION IS BEING GIVEN TO EMPLOYING A GAS SEPARATOR WHICH FITS IN THE DRINKING LINE. 
ORGAIU ZATION5-2490 
REFlRErKESMSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LI')'rli;:~ 
JUNE 1969 
--------------------------------------
RESOLUTIOtI: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
[yT--1 
TITLE: 
DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 25 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2,2.26 
SYSTEM: LM 
TITLE: HIGH NOISE LEVEL IN LM CABIN 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE EVENT TIME: 
PROBLEl.f: THE NOISE LEVEL WAS HIGH IN THE LM. 
1. THE S-BAND ANTENNA SOUNDE~ AS IF IT HAD BAD BEARINGS AND IT SHOOK THE LM WHENEVER IT 
WAS MOVED. 
THE STEERABLE ANTENNA WAS PARTICULARLY NOISY IN THE SLEW MODE DURING ALTITUDE 
CHAMBER TESTS; THE LM-4 ANTENNA IS NOT PECULIAR IN THIS RESPECT. THIS WAS NOT NOTICED 
ON LM-3, BECAUSE THE ANTENNA WAS NOT USED IN FLIGHT. 
2. THE CABIN AIR FANS WERE EXCESSIVELY NOISY; THE CREW TURNED THEM OFF AFTER 30 MINUTES. 
THE CREW STATED THAT THE CABIN FANS WERE NOT NEEDED. 
3. THE GLYCOL PUMPS WERE EXCESSIv~LY NOISY. 
TESTS WERE PER~ORMED ON LUNAR MODULE 8 TO VERIFY THE USE OF FLEXIBLE HOSES 
TO ISOLATE THE PUMP FROM THE TUBING AND ACT AS AN ATTENUATORi.HOWEVER, NOISE WAS 
ONLY SLIGHTLY REDUCED. FURTHER MODIFICATION TO THE LUNAR MODULE HARDWARE DOES NOT 
APPEAR PRACTICAL. THEREFORE, EAR PLUGS WILL BE OBTAINED FOR THE CREW TO USE DURING 
SLEEP PERIODS. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: MSC-FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING 
JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
1 83 
J 
ANOMAL Y RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.27 
SYSTEM: LM 
TITLE: YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT ERROR 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 98: 47 GET SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION 
PROBLEM: 
ACTIOH: 
THE OUTPUT FROM THE YAW RATE GYRO DID ~OT ALWAYS CORRESPOND TO ACTUAL VEHICLE YAW RATE 
DURING THE 50 SECOND PERIOD PRIOR TO STAGING AND SEVERAL SECONDS AFTER STAGiNG. FOR 
EXAMPLE IN ONE 12 SECOND PERIOD, THE GYRO APPEARED TO HANG UP AT MINUS 1.7 JLG/SEC. 
DURING THIS PERIOD, THE ACTUAL VEHICLE RATE WAS 0.2 DEG/SEC. THE GYRO OUTPUT APPEARS 
NORMAL BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE PERIOD OF ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS ON ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM 
AROUND STAGING. 
THE HISTORY OF THE GYROS ON APOLLO 11 WAS ANALYZED AND FOUND TO HAVE NO DISCREPANCIES. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF PERFORMING ADDITIONAL TESTS ON FOLLOW-ON UNITS AFTER INSTALLATION IS 
BEING CONSIDERED. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1969 
----------
DATE: 
REV: 
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DETA IL SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2 • 2 • 27 
TITLE: YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT ERROR 
----- -----
PRIOR TO INSTALLATION, EACH GYRO IS SUBJECTED TO "STIC'rION" AND CROSS-COUPLING TESTS WHICH 
EXERCISE IT WELL BEYOND THE RATES NORMALLY EXPERIENCED IN FLIGHT. ONCE INSTALLED, THE ONLY 
TESTS PERFORMED ARE ELECTRICAL TORQUING TESTS USING THE BUILT-IN TEST CIRCUITS. 
A MECHANICAL CAUSE OF THE TROUBLE APPEARS MORE LIKELY, SINCE CLEARANCES OF 0.0002 TO 0.0003 
INCH EXIST BETWEEN THE FLOAT AND CASE. IF A PARTICLE OF CONTAMINATION BECAME LODGED IN 
THIS SPACE, IT COUL.D CAUSE A TEMPORARY uFFSET AND COULD HAvE BEEN REMOVED DURING THE HIGH 
RATES FOLLOWING STAGING. 
NO GYRO FAILURES CAUS~D BY CONTAMINATION HAVE OCCURRED AFTER ACCEPTANCE; HOWEVER, EIGHT 
REJECTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH CONTAMINATION HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCED BY ~HE VENDOR. ONE OF THOSE 
OCCURRED ON THIS GYRO DURING BUILDUP WHEN IT FAILED A "STICTION" TEST. THE UNIT WAS REBUILT 
BUT AGAIN FAILED BECAUSE OF A BELLOWS LEAK. FINALLY, AFTER A SECOND REBUILDING, IT PASSED 
ACCEPTANCE. BECAUSE OF THIS HISTORY, THE SUSPECTED CAUSE OF THE t·1ALFtlNCTION IS CONTAMINATION ~ 
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ANOMAL Y RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.28 
SYSTEM: LM 
SUBSYSTEM: 
TITLE: INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 
PROBLEM: CI~ER PRESSURE SWITCHES. - CHAMBER PRESSURE SWITCHES IN THE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
FAILED CLOSED. SWITCH B3D FAILED CLOSED DURING THE INITIAL HOT-FIRE CHECKOUT. SHORTLY 
AFTER UNDOCKING, SWITCH B4U FAILED FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS, THEN LATER FAILED CLOSED 
PERMANENTLY. DURING THE ASCENT PROPULSION FIRING TO DEPLETION. SWITCH B2U FAILED CLOSED 
FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 MINUTES, THEN RECOVERED AND OPERATED PROPERLY. AFTER THE ASCENT 
PROPULSION FIRING TO DEPLETION, SWITCH A2D FAILED CLOSED FOR 13 SECONDS, AND LATER, SWITCH 
A1U BECAME ERRATIC. 
GLYCOL TEMPERATURE. - DURING THE FIRST MANNING, THE WATER/GLYCOL PUMP SWITCH WAS IN THE 
PUMP 2 POSITION, AND "THE INDICATED GLYCOL TEMPERATURE WAS ZERO. AT 94 HOuRS, THE SELECTOR 
SWITCH WAS SET TO PUMP 1, AND THE TEMPERATURE READING WAS NORMAL. 
REACTION CONTROL MANIFOLD PRESSURES. - AT 103 HOURS, THE INDICATED FUEL MANIFOLD PRESSURE IN 
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM - A DROPPED FROM 181 TO 168 PSIA AND THEN RETuRNED TO 181 PSIA AT 
106-1/2 HOURS. AT 108-1/2 HOURS, THIS MEASUREMENT DROPPED TO ZERO. SATISFACTORY OPERATION 
OF THE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM INDICATES A MEASUREMENT ANOMALY. THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE 
OF THIS ANOMALY IS EITHER A DEFECTIVE SPLICE IN THE 26-GAG~ WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANS-
DUCER OR AN INTERMITTENT CONNECTION INTERNAL TO THE TRANSDUCER. 
CASK THERMAL SHIELD TEMPERA'rURE. - THE TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT OF TrlE THERMAL SHIELD FOR THE 
RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR CASK READ UPPER LIMIT THROUGHOUT THE LUNAR MODULE PORTION OF 
THE FLIGHT. THE TELEMETRY IS SWITCHED TO THIS MEASUREMENT FROM CASK TFMPERATURE BY A BARO-
SWITCH AT 10000 FOOT ALTITUDE (FIGURE 2.2.28-2). 
ORGArnZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1969 
.. __ ._--------_. 
RESOLurON: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
DETAil SHEET 
ANOMAL Y 2. 2 • 28 
TITLE: INSTRUMENTATION DISCREPANCIES 
CHAMBER PRESSURE SWITCHES. - THE B2U AND A2D FAILURES ARE UNIQUE, IN THAT THE SWITCHES CLOSED 
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF CHAMBER PRESSURE, WHEREAS ALL THE OTHER FAILURES WERE INITI~TED BY 
ENGINE FIRINGS. THE FORMER FAILURES OCCURRED WHEN THE ENGINE CLUSTERS REACHED qIGH HEAT-SOAK-
BACK TEMPERATURES AFTER THE EXTREMELY HIGH FIRING ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ASCENT PRO-
PULSION FIRING. THE FAILURE MODE FOR THESE FIVE SWITCHES IS BELIEv~D TO BE THE SAME AS THAT 
OF ONE LM-3 UNIT AND SEVERAL OTHERS DURING GROUND TESTING. PARTICULATE CONTAMINATION AND/OR 
PROPELLANT RES IDUE IS FORCED UNDER T!-!E SWITCH DIAPHRAGM BY CHAMBER PRESSURE AND HOLDS THE 
DIAPHRAGM DEFLECTED AND THE ELECTRICAL CONTACTS CLOSED (SEE FIGURE2.2.28-1). THE SMALL STROKE OF 
THE DIAPHRAGM (0.007 INCH) AND THE LOW DIAPHRAGM RESTORING FOP.CE GENERATED BY THE RETURN SPRING 
MAKE THE SWITCH EXTREMELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO FAILURE BY CONTAMINATION, REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE WAS UNAFFECTED BY THESE SWITCH FAILURES. THE ONLY CONSEQUENCE WAS THE LOSS OF 
CAPABILITY TO DETECT AN ENGINE FAILED OFF. NO CORRECTIVE AC'iI('~~ P'OR RESOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER 
PRESSURE SWITCH FAILURES IS PLANNED. 
GLYCOL TEMPERATURE. - THE COOLANT PUMP SWITCH IS USED TO ROUTE EITm~R THE PRIMARY OR THE SECON-
DARY COOLANT TEMPERA'rURE TO THE DISPLAY. A JUMPER ACROSS THE PUMP 1 AND PUMP 2 CONTACTS 
ALLOWS DISPLAY OF THE PR~Y TEMPERATURE WHEN THE S~TITCH IS IN EITHER POSITION. THEREFORE, 
THE MOST LIKELY CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM WAS A BROKEN JUMPER OR A~ INCCMI-'LE'l'E CONTACT IH THE PUMP 
2 SWITCH POSITION. 
CASK THERMAL SHIELD TEMPERATURE. - THE PROBABLE CAUSES OF THE FAI~URE WERE A BROKEN WIHE 
IN THE SHIELD TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT, A FAILED TRANSDUCER, OR A F'AILUR.E OF THE BAROSWITCH 
TO TRANSFER. THE TRANSDUCER AND BAROSWITCH WERE TESTED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION AT THE LAUNCH 
SITE. AFTER I NSTAL'LAT ION , WORK WAS PERFORMED IN 'I'HE AREA, AND r) FURTHER CHECKOUT WAS PER-
FORMED. FOR FUTURE MISSIONS, THE INSTRUMENTA'l'ION WIRING WILL BE CHECKED AFTER F'INAL INSTALLA-
TION. THE MEASUREMENT IS NOT MANDATORY FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS, hND NO FURTHER CHANGFS WILL 
BE MADE. COOLING AIR IS FURNISHED TO THE CASK FROM THE LAUNCH VrHICLE INS~RUMENT UNIT THROUGH 
A 5-INCU DUCT. PRELAUNCH, INDICATIONS WERE THAT AIR WAS NOT BEING SUPPLIED. SINCE TrlE CASK 
ON THIS MISSION WAS NOT ACTIVATED, THE REQUIREMENT WAS WAIVED AND NO CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. 
TESTS AT MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER INDICATE THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS A RUPTURE OF THE 
DUCT AT THE UMBILICAL INTERFACE INSIDE THE INSTRUMENT UNIT W.~L. DESIGN CHANGES TO CORRECT 
THE PROBLEM HAVE BEEN MADE BY MARSHALL. 
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~. 2.2.29 
SYSTEM: LM 
SUBSYSTEM: S-BAND 
·1 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: BACKUP VOICE NOISE ON OMNI IN REVO:'UTION 13 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TlME: 
PROBLEM: DURING LUNAR REVOLUTIGN 13, THE BACKUP DOWNVOICE RECEIVED FROM THE LUNAR MODULE AT THE 
M1SSION CONTROL CENT6R WAS UNUSABLE BECAUSE OF LOW SPEECH LEVELS. PLAYBACK OF THE VOICE 
'l'APE RECORDED AT THE GOLDSTONE STATION SHOWED TI-Lz\T EXCELLENr QUALITY BACKUP VOICE WAS 
RECORDED AT THE OUTPUT OF THE DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE SPEECH LEVELS ON THE 
GOLDSTONE LUNAR MODULE A1R-'I'O-GROUND AND NETWORK 1 LOOPS WHICH INTERFACE WITH THE LINES 
~O THE MISSION CONTROL CENTER WERE EXTREMELY LOW. 
ACTION: INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT THE ONLY WAY THE PROBLEM COULD BE DUPLICATED WAS BY SIMULTANEOUSLY 
REMOTING BOTH NORMAL AND BACKUP DOWNVOICE FROM GOLDSTONE TO THE MISSION CONTROL CENTER. THIS 
IS NOT A STANDARD CONFIGURATION. THUS, THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS I~DICATE THAT THE RECEIPT 
OF UNUSABLE BACKUP VOICE WAS CAUSED BY AN OPERATOR ERROR WITHIN THE GOLDSTONE STATION. 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LIS~ING, JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.30 
SYSTEM: LM 
TITLE: DROP IN SIGNAL STRENGTH ON S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: S-BAND EVENT TIME: 13TH REV. 
PROBLEl"': 
ACTION: 
DURING THE BEGINNING OF REVOLUTION 13, THE S-BAND STEERABLE ANTENNA DID NOT PROPERLY TRACK. 
AT ACQUISITION OF SIGNAL, THE RECEIVED SIGNAL STRENGTH AT THE GROUND STATION INDICATED 
NEAR-BORESIGHT CONDITION FOR THE ANTENNA. OVER THE NEXT 13 MINTJTES, THE SIGNAL STRENGTH 
GRADUALLY DECREASED 20 DB. A PLOT OF' EXPECTED SIGNAL STRENGTH (FIG.2.2.30-1), CONSIDERING 
SPACECRAFT ATTITUDE CHANGES AND ANTENNA GAIN PATERNS, SHOWED THAT THE ANTENNA WAS NOT 
MOVING AT THIS TIME. THE ANTENNA PERFORMED WELL BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THIS PERIOD. 
THE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR FAILURE OF THE ANTENNA TO MOVE WERE EITHER THAT THE SERVO SYSTEM 
CIRCUIT WAS OPEN OR THE ANTENNA TRACK-MODE SWITCH WAS IN THE SLEW OR OFF POSITION. 
THE TRACK-MODE SWITCH FOR THE STEERAB~E ANTENNA IS A THREE-POSITION SWIrCH (DOWN-SLEW; 
CENTER - OFF; UP - AUTO). THE CREW REPORTED THAT THE SWITCH MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY 
BEEN SWITCHED TO OFF INSTEAD OF TO AUTO AT THE TIME ACQUISITION HAD BEENffiTABLISHED. 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING JUNE 1969 REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.31 TITLE: DPS GIMBAL DRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED 
SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 100: 58 SUBSYSTEM: DPS 
PROBLEl~: A MASTER ALARM AND ASSOCIATEiJ ENGINE PI'J?CH GIMBAL FAIL WARNING WERE RECEIVED DURING TdE 
PHASING MANEUVER. "COASTING", AN UNCOMl1ANDED GIMBAL MOVEMENT WHICH RESULTS vlHEN THE 
SPRING-LOADED BRAKE FAILS TO ENGAGE AFTER REMOVAL OF DRIVE SIGN.~S, HAD OCCURRED DURING 
CHECKOUT OF THIS GIMBAL. A RECURRENCE OF THE COASTING, WHICH IS NOT DETRIMENTAL, WAS 
NOT UNEXPECTED. THE TELEMETRY DATA INDICATE THAT THE PITCH AND YAW ACTUATORS BOTH DROVE 
AS EXPECTED. THE SMALL NUMBER OF THR~STER FIRINGS ALSO DEMONSTRATE THAT THRUST VECTOR 
CONTROL WAS MAINTAINED USING THE ACTUATORS. DURING THE MANEUVER, THE GIMBAL FAIL WAS IN-
DICATED AT THE TIME OF A REVERSAL IN PITCH GIMBAL MOTION. 
BECAUSE OF THE SAMPliE RATE OF THE TELEMETRY DATA, THE TIME OF THE GIMBAL FAIL INl :CATION 
CANNOT BE PRECISELY ESTABLISHED, BUT THE DATA ENCOMPASS A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE GIMBAL 
COMMAND REVERSED (FIG.2.2.31-1)THUS,THE COASTING COULD HAVE ALLOWED GIMBAL MOVEMENT FOR 
0.25 SECOND WITHOUT A COMMAND WHICH CAUSES THE FAIL INDICATION. FIGURE 2.2.31--2, SHOWS THE 
DESCENT ENGINE TRIM CONTROL FAILURE DETECTION LOGIC. 
ACTION: FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT, THE BRAKE MECHANISM HAS BEEN REDESIGNED, AND TqE ALLOWABLE 
TIME FOR MOVEMENT WITHOUT COMMAND HAS BEEN INCREASED TO 0.50 SECOND. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 
REFEREr~CES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 12 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMAJ~Y LISTING 
JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED 
.u _--------------------------~- .. ---.---." ~'" ... ""~" ... ~ .. 
DATE: 
Rtv: 
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TITt F : DPS GIMBAL uRIVE PITCH ACTUATOR FAILED 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: COMMANDERS OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM HEATER LIGHT DID 
NOT COME ON 
SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
DURING CHECKOUT OF THE COMMANDER'S OXYGEN PURGE SYSTEM, THE HEATER LIGHT DID NOT COME ON. 
COMPONENT AND CIRCUIT ANALYSES DO NOT INDICATE A DESIGN DEFECT. ALSO, COMPONENTS WERE 
VIBRATION-TESTED TO FAILURE AND THE SYSTEM WAS VIBRATION TESTED USING FLIGHT TYPE BRACKETS, 
BUT THESE TESTS DID NOT DUPLICATE THE FAILURE. ANALYTICAL STUDIES HAD INDICATED THAT 
WITHOUT THE HEATERS, THE MINIMUM TEMPERATURE OF THE GAS AT THE HELMET WILL BE ABOUT MINUS 
10° F. MANNED TESTS INDICATE THAT THIS TEMPERATURE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR COMFORT AND THAT THE 
HEATER IS NOT NEEDED. 
WITHOUT THE HEATERS, NO MECHANICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN 'l';:i... .L :)r~~M WERE ENCOUNTERED. NO HARD-
WARE CHANGE IS REQUIRED FOR APOLLO 11. 
ORGAIHZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE A.~D ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1969 REV: 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.33 TITLE: LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING 
SYSTEM: LM 
SUBSYSTEM: STABILIZATION & CONTROL 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 102: 42 GET 
PROBLEr .. : LARGE ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS OCCURRED PRIOR TO AND DtJl<.ING STAGING (FIG. 2.2.33-1). BODY RA'l'ES 
OF 19 DEG/SEC IN PITCH AND GREATER THAN 25 DEG/SEC IN ROLL AND YAW WERE RECORDED. SMALL YAW 
ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 40 SECONDS PRIOR TO STAGING. THE MODE SWITCHING, 
TELEMETRY, AND ASSOCIATED ATTITUDE COMMANDS INDICATE THAT THE ABORT GUICANCE MODE CHANGED 
FROM"ATT HOLD"TO"AUTO"COINCIDENT WITH THE VEHICLE GYRATIONS. THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES 
ON PANELS 3 AND 4 ARE bHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-3 AND A SIMPLIFIED FUNCTIONAL SWITCHING 
DIAGRAM IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-2. APPROXIMATELY 4 MINUTES BEFORE STAGING, WITH THE 
GUIDANCE SELECT SWITCH IN AGS AND THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES IN PULSE, THE CREW VERIFIED 
THAT THE ABORT GUIDANCE MODE CONTROL SWITCH WAS IN"ATT HOLD"SINCE THE INTENT WAS TO PERFORM 
STAGING IN AGS"ATT HO·LD." AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THEY SELECTED MAX DEADBAND TO SAVE PRO-
PELLANT. 
ACTION: THE ANOMALY WAS PROCEDURAL. THE CREW, IN DIAGNOSING THE EARLIER YAw RATE GYRO PROBLEM, AND 
IN REACTING TO IT, TRANSFERRED THE ABORT GUIDANCE MODE SWITCH TO THE AUTO POSITION. THIS 
RESULTED IN THE HIGH VEHICLE RATES EXPERIENCED. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 
REFEREr~CES: MSC 5-DAY REPORT, P. 12 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY LISTING 
JUNE 1969 
RESaLllTION: CLOSED 
._----------_._---------- -_ .. _- - ---_. __ .. _._. 
DATE: 
REv: 
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TITLE: LARGE LM ATT~TUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING 
THE ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM STEERING LOGIC WAS SET TO Z-AXIS STEERING THROUGHOUT THE STAGING 
SEQUENCE. IF AUTO MODE IS SELECTED, Z-AXIS LOGIC WILL PRODUCE THE STEERING COMMA!-lDS REQUIRED 
TO POINT THE Z-AXIS AT THE COMMAND MODULE. IF THE GUIDANCE SELECT SWITCH IS IN AGS AND 
ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES IN"MODE CONT,"TH:'" ;-AXIS STEERING COMMANDS ARE ACCEPTED AND ACTED 
UPON BY THE CONTROL SYSTEM. 
THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES WERE SEQUENTIALLY THROWN TO "MODE CONT:' AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-3, 
51 SECONDS BEFORE STAGING. FIV3 SECONDS AFTER THE SELECTION OF"MODE CONT;' THE MODE CONTROL 
SWITCH INDICATION CHANGED FROM"ATT HOLD TO AUTO: REMAINED IN AUTO FOR 3 SECONDS, THEN RETURNED 
TO·A~~ HOLD~ DURING THIS PERIOD, THE VEHICLE MOVED IN ALL THREE AXES IN RESPONSE TO Z-AXIS 
STEERING COMMANDS. AFTER THE MODE INDICATION RETURNED TO "ATT HOLD:' THE DYNAMICS AGAIN RETURNED 
TO NORMAL FOR WIDE DEADBAND. (NOTE: THE YAW RATE GYRO OUTPUT WAS INCORRECT DURING THIS PERIOD, 
AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.2.33-1).THE GRYO PROBLEM WAS PROBABLY DIAGNOSED BY THE CREW AFTER A NUMBER OF 
HAND CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.) AF~ER APPROXIMATELY 40 SECONDS, THE MODE INDICATION AGAIN RETURNED 
TO .AUTO, AND THE VEHICLE RESPONDED TO Z-AXIS STEERING COMMANDS. THE VEHICLE WAS STAGED 4 
SECONDS LATER, AND THE DYNAMIC RESPONSE INCREASED ABRUPTLY. THE DATA INDICATE THAT STAGING 
WAS COINCIDEN~ WITH A MINUS X TRANSLATIO~ AND THAT THE PRIMARY GUDIANCE SYSTEM MODE CONTROL 
SWITCH WAS THROWN TO AUTO 7 SECONDS LATER. BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVE SCALING OF THE HAND 
CONTROLLER, RATE GYROS, AND ATTITUDE ERRORS, ATTEMPTS TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE MOTION WERE 
lNEFFECTIV~, AND THE VEHICLE STABILIZED WITH THE Z-AXIS POINTING TOWARD THE COMMAND MODULE. 
APPROX!HATELY 24 SECONDS AFTER STAGING, THE ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES RETURNED TO "DIR~' AND THE 
TWO MODE CONTROL SWITCH INDICATIONS RETURNED TO "ATT HOLD!' 
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TITLE: LARGE LM ATTITUDE EXCURSIONS DURING STAGING 
THREE CONDITIONS DURING THE STAGING SEQUENCE WERE APPARENTLY ABNORMAL: 
1. ~HE ABORT GUIDANCE MODE CONTROL TRANSFERRED FROM ATTITUDE-HOLD AUTOMATIC. 
2. THE YAW RATE GYRO WAS INDICATING MINUS 1.7 DEG/SEC. 
3. NO INDICATION OF DIRECT FIRING OF REACTION CONTROL ENGINES WERE RECEIVED. (THE CREW 
RECALLED ENABLING THE DIRECT FUNCTION AND ACTUATING THE HAND CONTROLLER TO THE HARD 
STOPS. ) 
IT IS, THEREFORE, CONCLUDED THAT THE ANOMALY WAS CAUSED BY THE INADVERTENT CYCLING OF THE 
ABORT GUIDANCE MODE CONTROL SWITCH, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY AN INCORRECT OUTPUT OF THE YAW 
RATE GYRO. IN DIAGNOSING THE YAW RATE GYRO PROBLEM, AND IN REACTING TO IT, THE ABORT 
GUIDANCE MODE CO~~~OL SWITCH WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTO POSITION, RESULTING IN HIGH VEHICLE 
RATES DURING THE STAGING SEQUENCE. 
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ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.34 TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEMS 
SYSTEM: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
SUBSYSTEM: OPTICAL SYSTEM EVENT TIME: 
PROBLEM: THREE OPERATIONAL ANOMALIES IN USE OF THE LUNAR MODULE OPTICAL SYSTEM WERE REPORTED BY THE 
CREW. 
RETICLE CONTAMINATION. - THE CREW REPORTED HAIR-LIKE OBJECTS ON THE RETICLE OF THE ALIGNMENT 
OPTICAL TELESCOPE. SEVERAL MECHANICAL CLEARANCES IN THE TELESCOPE CAN PROVIDE PATHS FOR 
CONTAMINATION. THE FIXED REDIRECTIONAL MIRROR AT THE ELBOW OF THE TELESCOPE (FIG.2.2.34-2)H1S 
AN AIR GAP OF 0.0005 TO 0.0007 INCH TO ALLOW THE~L EXPANSION OF THE MIRROR. OTHER POS-
SIBLE PATHS ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE CABIN AND WOULD REQUIRE THAT PARTICLES FILTER THROUGH 
LUBRICATED BEARINGS TO REACH THE FOCAL PLANE OF THE TELESCOPE. 
COMPUTER CONTROL AND RETICLE DIMMER. - THE CREW REPORTED MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY WITH THE 
DIMMER CONTROL OF THE COMPUTER CONTROL AND RETICLE DIMMER. THE RHEOSTAT CONTROL KNOB 
(THUMBWHEEL) WOULD PHYSICALLY FALL FORWARD FROM THE BRIGHT POSITION TO MAXIMUM BRIGHTNESS, 
THUS REQUIRING MANUAL HOLD TO MAINTAIN THE DIMMER CONTROL IN POSITION. THE OPERATION 
DESCRIBED BY THE CREW IS NORMAL. 
STAR DISAPPEARANCE. - THE CREW REPORTED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY SIX STAR DIAMETERS FROM THE 
CENTER OF THE RETICLE, STARS DISAPPEARED FROM VIEW. NO IMPERFECTIONS EXISTED IN THE RETICLE 
OR OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE OPTICAL TRAIN THAT WOULD CAUSE THE PROELEM. HO~~VER, THE SURFACE 
OF THE PRISM MAY HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED (SUCH AS A FINGERPRINT SMUDGE) DURING FINAL INSTALLA 
TION OF THE TELESCOPE SUNSHADE. 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED 
__ -------------------..;.;.-----.-~-..-..... -.. .. -.c ..... 
DATE: 
REV: 
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TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEM 
ACTION: 
RETICLE CONTAMINATION. - PREFLIGHT RECORDS SHOW THAT THE TELESCOPE WAS ASSEMBLED, TESTED, AND STORED 
IN A CLASS 10 CLEAN ROOM (PARTICLE SIZE ALLOWABLE IS O.OOOOl-INCH DIAMETER PER 10 000 CUBIC FEET 
OF VOLUME) UNTIL INSTALLED IN THE VEHICLE. ONCE INSTALLED, COVERS WERE PROVIDED AND THE TELESCOPE 
WAS INSPF.CTED AND CLEANED PERIODICALLY. THE LAST CLEANING WAS ON THE DAY BEFORE LAUNCH, AND AT THAT 
TIME, THE FIELD OF VIEW WAS NOT CONTAMINATED. 
COMPUTER CONTROL AND RETICLE DIMMER. - THE THUMBWHEEL OPERATES A VARIABLE RESISTOR THROUGH A SHAFT/ 
CAM MEc~mNICAL INTERFACE (FIG.2.2.34-1). FRICTIONAL FORCE GENERATED BY ~HE ARM OF THE MICROSWITCH IS 
PRESENT FROM THE FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE POSITION (FULL DIM) THROUGH 270 DEGREES OF CLOCKWISE RO'.I.'ATION 
(80 PERCENT BRIGHTNESS). THE TYPICAl TORQUE REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THE FRICTIONAL FORCE IN THE 270-
DEGREE SECTOR IS 1.5 INCH/OUNCES. WHEN THE MICROSWITCH DEPRESSES INTO THE GO-DEGREE DETENT AREA OF 
THE CAM, THE FRICTIONAL FORCE DECREASES. ALTHOUGH THE THUMBWHEEL CAN ROTATE THROUGH AN ADDITIONAL 
60-DEGREES, RETICLE BRIGHTNESS IS NOT CHANGED, SINCE THE MICROSWITCH HAS BYPASSED POTENTIOMETER CONTROL 
OF THE CIRCUIT AND HAS APPLIED FULL VOLTAGE TO THE RETICLE LAMPS (FIG. 2.2.34-1). IN THE DEPRESSED AREA 
OF THE CAM, ANY MOTION IMPARTED TO THE ~HUMBWHEEL WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE MECHANICAL STOPS OF THE 
VARIABLE RESISTOR ARE REACHED. THIS FEATURE INCREASES 7HE RELIABILITY OF THE RETICLE LAMP CONTROL 
BY INCLUDING A MECHANICAL OVERRIDE THAT WILL ASSURE RETICLE BRIGHTNESS IF AN ELECTRICAL COMPONENT 
FAILS. 
STAR DISAPPEARANCE. - THE LM-S PRISM AND RETICLE WERE CLEANED AND INSPECTED WHEN THE SUNSHADE Wl~ 
INSTALLED. A TEST CHANGE NOTICE IS BEING WRITTEN TO REQUIRE A SIMILAR CLEANING FOR SUBSEQUENT V2HICLES. 
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TITLE: OPTICAL SYSTEM PROBLEM 
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FIG. 2.2.34-1 OPTICS RETICLE DI~~ER 
- ------ ------- ------ ---- - -------
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NO. 2.2.35 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITLE: ABNORMAL RISE IN CO2 INDICATIONS ON PRIMARY LIOH CARTRIDGE 
SYSTEfr',: LM MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 97-106 SUBSYSTEM: ECS GET 
PROBLEM: 
ACTION: 
TWO ASPECTS OF THE INDICATED CARBON DIOXIDE LEVEL WERE CONSIDERED ANOMALOUS. FIRST, THE 
RATE OF CARBON DIOXIDE INCREASE FROM 97 TO 101 HOURS EXCEEDED THE PREDICTED BY A FACTOR 
OF APPROXIMATELY 8. SECONDLY, THE LEVEL REMAINED CONSTANT FOR THE NEXT 5 HOURS. 
LITHIUM HYDROXIDE CARTRIDGE VARIATIONS, COMBINED WITH CARBON DIOXIDE SENSOR TOLERANCES, 
COULD AC~--:':JNT FOR THE FLIGHT PERFORMANCE. THE PREDICTION FOR FUTURE FLIGHT WILL BE 
MODF.LE~ AkOUND ~~RE REALISTIC OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. 
ORGAIUZATION: 5-2490 RESOLunON: CLOSED DATE: REFERENCES: MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1S69 
----------------------------_. ---"-'~'~--~--
REV: 
ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.36 TITLE: LM CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION 
SYSTEM: LM 
SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 108:23 
PROBLEM: WHEN FINAL LM/CSM SEPARATION OCCURRED, THE LM CABIN PRESSURE DROPPED FROM 4.8 PSIA TO 
0.7 PSIA WITHIN A 12-SECOND PERIOD. THE DECAY RATE WAS MUCH GREATER THAN THE CABIN 
PRESSURE RELIEF CAPABILITY OF ANY OF THE CABIN OVERBOARD DUMP vALVES. THE LM 
SEPARATED FROM THE CSM SO RAPIDLY THAT THE CREW LOST SIGHT OF IT. THE CREW ALSO 
REPORTED "A LOT OF SNOW n OUTSIDE AT SEPARATION. SEPARATION VELOCITY WAS 4.8 FT/SEC. 
ALONG THE X AXIS, WITH ESSENTIALLY NO MOTION ALONG OR ROTATION ABOUT THE OTHER AXES. 
ACTION: THE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT THE LOADING ON THE LUNAR MODULE HATCH AT SEPARATION 
EXCEEDED THE CAPABILITY OF THE LATCH. THE HATCH THEN OPENED AND CLOSED RESULTING IN 
A CABIN PRESSURE DECAY AS SHOWN IN FIGURE Z.2.36-2 AND SEPARATION DISTANCE. 
ORGAIU ZA nON: 
REFERENCES: 
NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED SINCE THE CONDITIONS AT SEPARATION WERE NOT NORMAL. 
5-2490 
MSC 5-DAY REPORT; PP. 11, 14 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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TITLE: LM CABIN DEPRESSURIZED AT FINAL SEPARATION 
MOTION PICTURES OF THE FINAL SEPARATION WERE TAKEN FROM THE COMMAND MODULE. A BROWN MATERIAL 
WAS SHOWN PROJECTING PROM THE TUNNEL AND FLAPPING; THIS WAS THE INSULATION AROUND THE COMMAND 
MODULE DOCKING RING. THE LUNAR MODULE HATCH WAS CLOSED IN THE FIRST FRAME IN WHICH IT WAS 
VISIBLE. THIS FRAME WAS TAKEN 2 SECONDS AFTER INITIATION OF SEPARATION. 
THE IMPULSE FROM DOMPING THE CABIN THROUGH THE HATCH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DIRECTION AND 
MAGNITUDE OF THE LUNAR MODULE VELOCITY CHANGE (5 FT/SEC IN MINUS X DIRECTION) NOTED FROM 
THE FLIGHT DATA. FURTHER, THE ONLY ITEM ON TOP OF THE LUNAR MODULE THAT COULD OPEN AND CLOSE, 
ALLOWING THE CABIN TO VENT WHILE SATISFYING THE PRESSURE HISTORY, IS THE UPPER HATCH. THE 
HATCH HAS A MAXIMUM AREA OF Ina SQUARE INCHES, WHICH IS MORE THAN ENOUGH TO VENT THE CABIN 
FROM 4. a TO LESS THAN 1.0 PSIA IN 0.3 SECOND. 
THE MECHANISM POSTULATED TO VENT THE CABIN IS AS FOLLOWS. THE PYROTECHNIC DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE 
BROKE THE HATCHLATCH TO ALLOW THE CABIN TO VENT TqROUGH THE DOCKING TUNNEL. THE OUTFLOW 
CLOSED THE HATCH 0.3 SECOND AFTER SEPARATION BUT DID NOT SEAL IT COMPLETELY. THE GAP REMAINING 
(ABOUT 1~4 SQUARE INCHES) ALLOWED A SLIGHT PRESSURE DECREASE, AS INDICATED BY CABIN PRESSURE 
DATA. 
ON APOLLO 9, THE CABIN PRESSURE WAS MAINTAINED AFTER SEPARATION. T ~ ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
APOLLO 9 AND 10 WAS THAT THE APOLLO 10 TUNI.~1::L COULD NOT BE VENTED i.~~CAUSE THE VEN'r LINE WAS 
CAPPED. AT THE TIME SEPARATION PYROTECHNICS WERE FIRED ON APOLLO 9, THE TUNNEL PRESSURE WAS 
LESS TfY.AN THE LUNAR MODULE CABIN PRESSURE; THUS, THE DYNAMIC PRESSURE IN THE TUNNEL WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO FAIL THE HATCH LATCH. ON APOLLO 10, \IITH THE TUNNEL PRESSURIZED TO 4.86 PSIA, 
THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WHEN THE PYROTECHNICS WERE FIRED WAS ENOUGH TO FAIL THE LATCH. 
---- ------- '------- -- -- ---- - . 
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FIG. 2.2.36-1 MEASURED CABIN PRESSURE DURING JETTISON 
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ANOt\'Al Y REPORT 
NO. 2.2.37 
SYSTEM: LM 
TI~~E:CAMERA FAILURES 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: SUBSYSTEM: GOVERNMENT-Ft'RNISHED EQUIPMENT 
PROBLEr.,: 
ACTION: 
PROBi.EM: 
ACTION: 
DURING THE LOW-ALTITUDE LUNAR PASS, THE HASSELBLAD 70-MM CAMERA, WHICH I1A!1 THE IJAST 
MAGAZINE INSTALLED, STOPPED BECAHSE OF FILM BINDING IN THE M~GAZINE. THE BINDING 
RESULTED FROM INTERNAL DAMAGE TO THE FILM-ADVANCE MECHANISM, INCLUDING BURRS ON THE 
FILM GUIDE (SEE FIG. 2.2.37-1). rHE EMULSI N SCRAPED FROM THE FILM BY THE BUPRS BUILT 
UP ON THP. ROLLERS, DECREASIN~ THE ~LEARANCE. THIS CONDITION CONTINUOUSLY OVERLOADED 
THE DRIVE MOTOR UNTIL THE MOTOR FAILED AP~ROXI~\TELY FIVE FRAMES FROM THE END OF FILM. 
THE 1.6-AMPERE FUSE IN THE CAMERA WOULD HAVE PR)TECTED THE MOTOR AGAINST A DI:lliCT SHORT, 
PUT NOT AGAINST A CONTINUOUS OVErLOAD. 
FOR FUTURE MISSIONS A HIGH-RELIABILITY, 1.2 AMPERE FUSE3 WILL BE INSTALLED (EACH CAMERA 
WILL HAVE ONE FJJSE AND SLUG). 
DURING THE LOW-ALTITUDE PASS, THE ~UNAR MODULE 16-MM CAMERA FAILED TO OPERATE WITH 
MAGAZINE F INST~LL~D. MAGAZINE F WAS REPLACED IMMEDIATELY WITH MAGAZINE G, AND THE 
CAMERA OPERATED SATISFACTORILY. MAGAZINE F WAS REINS'l:ALLED LATER FOR STAGING AND THE 
TE~IN.~ PHASE OF THE RENDEZVOUS! ~.ND THE CAMERA OPERATED SAT I SFAC']'ORI LY . 
ALL MAGAZINES FOR SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS WILL BE SELCTED FOR ADEQUATE CLEARANCE Od THE 
INTERFACE EDGES FOR ~ SATISFACTORY FIT TO ~ITHER CAMERA. 
ORGArH lArIm:; 5-'-490 RESOLUTION. CLOSE..) DATE: kEFlRENCE!;: MSC 5-DAY REPOkT 
MSC FAILURE AND ANOMAI·Y LI3TING, JUNE 1969 REV: 
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ANOMALY RE PORT 
NO. 2.2.38 TITLE: FAILURE TO GET ADEQUATE DATA DUMPS 
SYSTEM: LM 
SUBSYSTEM: COMMUNICATIONS 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 99 39 GET 
PROBLEM: THE DUMP OF THE LUNAR MODULE LOW-BIT-RATE PCM DATA RECORDED IN THE COMMAND MODULE CEASED 
ABRUPTLY AT 99:38:52. THE DATA SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED THROUGH THE DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION 
MANEUVER AT APPROXIMATELY 99:46:00. A REVIEW OF THE DATA FROM 99:35:10 TO 99:38:52 
VERIFIED THAT THE COMMAND MODULE WAS CONFIGURED FOR VHF SIMPLEX-A VOICE AND VHF SIMPLEX-R 
DATA. THE FLIGHT PLAN REQUIRED THAT THE COMMAND MODULE BE RECONFIGURED FRO~ THIS 
MODE TO VHF/AM DUPLEX-B/RANGING AT APPROXIMATELY 99:37:00. 
ACTION: SINCE THE FLIGHT PLAN TIMES WERE INCORRECT BY APPROXIMATELY 12 MINUTES, '.rEE RECONFIGURA'lION 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 99:49:00. 
ORGAfH ZA liON: 
. REFERENCES: 
5-2490 
MSC 5-DAY REPORT 
MSC FAIWRE AND ANOMALY 
LISTING, JUNE 1969 
RESOLUTION: CLOSED 
_.-----00:---.------------------------.. -.-.. --._._---...... _.-- .-
DATE: 
REV: 
ANOMALY REPORT 
NO. 2.2.39 
SYSTEM: LM 
SUBSYSTEM~ APS 
fITLE: !,~p::; Lew LEVEL INDICATIONS 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: 102: 55 
PROBLEM: THE APS WARNING LIGHT INDICATING LOW PROPELLANT LEVEL CAME ON APPROXIMATELY ONE SECOND 
AFTER THE START OF THE FIRST APS FIRING AND TRIGGERED A MASTER ALARM. THE LOW-LEVEL 
LIGHT WENT OU,!, ONE SECOND LATER, AND THE MASTER ALARM WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESET. DATA 
INDICATE THAT THE LOW-LEVEL LIGHT AND MASTER ALARM WERE TRIGGERED BY THE OXIDIZER 
SENSOR. EAC8 OF THE TANKS, OXIDIZER AND FUEL, CONTAINS ONE SENSOR. ONE LOW-LEVEL 
WARNING LIGHT MONITORS BOTH SENSORS, AND THIS LIGHT IS ENABLED ONLY WHILE THE ASCENT 
ENGINE IS FIRING. NEITHER THE SENSORS NOR THE LOW-LEVEL WARNING LIGHT ARE LATCHING, 
SO THE WARNING LIGHT WILL COME ON WHEN THE SENSOR IS UNCOVERED AND WILL EXTINGUISH WHEN 
THE SENSOR IS RE-COVERED WITH PROPELLANT. DATA INDICATE THAT THE SENSORS FUNCTIONED 
PROPERLY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MISSION. BOTH LOW-LEVEL INDICATIONS CAME ON AT THE 
CORRECT TIME DURING THE SECOND ASCENT ENGINE FIHING, THE FIRING TO DEPLETION. THIS 
INDICATES THAT THE FIRST WARNING WAS VALID AND CAUSED BY THE SENSOR BEING UNCOVERED 
BY A GAS BUBBLE. THE ASCENT P~OPELLANT TANKS WERE FILLED APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT. 
THE +X TRANSLATION REQUIRED TO SETTLE THE PROPELLANTS TO PREVENT HELIUM INGESTION INTO 
THE ENGINE WAS CALCULATED TO BE 3 SECONDS. BASED ON THE APOLLO 10 DATA, THE PREDICTION 
TECHNIQUE WILL BE REVISED, AND THE +X TRANSLATION FIRING TIME WILL BE INCREASED TO 
PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE LOW-LEVEL MASTER ALARM AT IGNITION. 
ACTION: NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR APOLLO 11 AND SUBSEQUENT. FOR NOMINAL MISSIONS, 
ONLY ONE ASCENT ENGINE FIRING IS PLANNED. THIS WILL OCCUR FROM THE LUNAR SURFACE 
(1/6-9 FIELD), AND THE PROPELLANTS WILL BE WELL SETTLED. 
ORGAIU ZA TI ON: 
REFEREf~CES : 
5- 2490 
APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT, AUGUST 1969 RESOLUTIOtl: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
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NO. 2.2.40 
SYSTEM: CM 
SUBSYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
ANOMALY REPORT 
TITtE: LEFT-HAND HEAD STRUT LOCKOUT HANDLE 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: POSTFLIGHT 
PROBLEM: POSTFLIGHT, THE LEFT-HAND HEAD STRUT LOCKOUT HANDLE WAS IN THE READY (LOCKED) POSITION. 
DURING LEVER FORCE CHECKS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LEVER SPRING DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT 
FORCE TO PREVENT THE HOOD FROM RETURNING TO THE LOCKED POSITION. DISASSEMBLY SHOWED 
THAT THE SPRING HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY INSTALLED. A REVIEW OF MANUFACTURING RECORDS 
INDICATED THAT THE LOCKING MECHANISM HP~ BEEN MODIFIED AND THAT NO INSPECTION OR TEST 
BAD BEEN PERFORMED SUBSEQUENT TO THIS MODIFICATION. 
ACTIOH:A MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS TO ASSURE PROPER 
ASSEMBLY. THE APOLLO 11 AND 12 SPACECRAFT AT THE LAUNCH SITE HAVE BEEN INSPECTED. 
ORGArUZATION: 5-2490 
REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT, AUGUST 1969 RESOLUTION: CLOSED DATE: 
REV: 
, , 
- .,.,.,. 
ANOMALY REPORT 
NO·2. 2. 41 
SYSTEM: CM 
TITLE: FLASHING LIGHT FAILURE 
MISSION: APOLLO 10 
EVENT TIME: LANDING SUBSYSTEM: ELS 
PROBLEM: THE RECOVERY FORCES OBSERVED THAT THE FLASHING LIGHT WAS OPERATING WHILE THE SPACECRAFT 
MAS DESCENDING ON THE MAIN PARACHUTES BUT NOT AFTER THE SPACECRAFT LANDED. POSTFLIGHT, 
THE GLASS TUBE WHICH CONTAINS THE FLASHING ELEMENT WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE BULB 
ASSEMBLY, PART OF THE FLASHING RECOVERY BEACON, WAS REPLACED, AND THE BEACON OPERATED 
PROPERLY. FURTHER ANALYSIS IS BEING PERFORMED. 
ACTIOH: 
ORGANIZATION: 5-2490 RESOLUTION: OPEN REFERENCES: APOLLO 10 MISSION REPORT, AUGUST 1969 DATE: 
REV: 
= 
, , 
-
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2.3.0 
----- -_.-
, ' 
THE GROUND SYSTEMS SUPPORTING THE APOLLO 10 COUNTDOWN AND LAUNCH PERFORM.ED SATISFAC-
TORILY. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT FAILURES OR ANOMALIES. SEVERAL SYSTEMS EXPERIENCED 
COMPONENT FAILURES AND MALFUNCTIONS, BUT THESE PROBLEMS DID NOT CAUSE ANY HOLDS OR 
SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN THE SCHEDULED SEQUENCES OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS. SOME OF THE NOTABLE 
FAILURES WERE: 
o LOSS OF RP-1 FAST FILL VALVE OPEN INDICATION 
o RP-1 LEVEL ADJUST VALVE CLOSE COMMAND WAS ISSUED LATE. \ 
o LOX LOADING WAS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 50 MINUTES DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE IN THE 
4160-VAC PUMP MOTOR STARTER CIRCUIT. 
o SERVICE ARM NUMBER 1 UMBILICAL CARRIER WITHDRAWAL TIME WAS 0.43 SECONDS GREATER 
THAN SPECIFIED MAXIMUM. 
o SERVICE ARM NUMBER 8 UMBILICAL HAS NOT WITHDRAWN. 
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